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Michalak  1 
During his time as Chief Justice from 1921 to 1930, William Howard Taft transformed 
the federal court system from a clunky, localized nineteenth-century institution to a national 
institution of efficiency, rigor, and clarity.  Taft not only proposed two major judicial reform 
bills, but he also improved the judicial management of the federal courts and promoted the unity 
of his own Court.  Taft redefined the role of the chief justice in an unprecedented manner, 
characterizing the position as the true executive of the judiciary.  These transformations enabled 
the Supreme Court to serve its true purpose: interpreting the 1787 Constitution and its 
amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment.   
In order to interpret Chief Justice Taft’s success, one must consider the historical context 
surrounding his tenure on the Court, why Taft took on the enormous task of reforming the 
federal courts, and how these changes shaped the federal courts for years to come.  Taft achieved 
reform through a variety of methods unique to him, including employing his charm and 
networking skills, utilizing his experience as a jurist and politician, gaining support from his 
brethren on the Court, and using the larger culture of reform during the Progressive Era at the 
time to his advantage.   
Taft expanded the power of the federal courts in various areas and expanded the power of 
the chief justiceship.  However, this expansion raises a central issue: whether or not Taft stepped 
outside of the power granted to him as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to create this change.  
It is true that the federal courts needed structural reform; the crowded dockets and inefficient 
strategies used by federal courts delayed the delivery of decisions, which according to Taft, was 
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an outright denial of justice.1  The way in which Taft brought reform to the federal court system 
was not an overextension of his power.  However, it cannot be denied that Taft engaged in 
reform partially out of self-interest, but not necessarily in a negative or self-aggrandizing 
fashion.  His love for the judiciary was obvious, and serving as Chief Justice proved his greatest 
joy in life.   
A Life Chasing the Bench: William Howard Taft 1857-1930 
To this day, Taft is the only person in United States history to serve as both the president 
of the United States and the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.  His legacy, 
however, is not limited to these two positions.  Born on September 15, 1857 in Cincinnati, Ohio 
to Louise and Alphonso Taft, Taft grew up in a large family of moderate means in a suburb of 
Cincinnati.  In time, he left Ohio to attend his father’s alma mater, Yale University, for 
undergraduate studies.  His popularity and reputation began there where his classmates believed 
him to be the most admired and respected man in his class.2  Once he graduated, it was no 
question that Taft would go on to study law.  It was a family tradition, considering that his father 
and all of his brothers attended or planned to attend law school.  Compared to the rigor of his 
undergraduate courses at Yale, “the pace for Will Taft dramatically lessened in intensity while he 
 
1 William Howard Taft.  “Three Needed Steps of Progress,” American Bar Association Journal 
8, (1922): 34.   
2 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative.  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7-8.   
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was at law school.”3  In 1880, he graduated from Cincinnati Law School and was admitted to the 
Ohio bar in the same year.   
Taft remained in Ohio to begin his career, starting out as “assistant to the Cincinnati 
prosecutor” where he served barely a year.4  Thanks to his father’s prominent political status in 
Ohio and the fact that “Will Taft had no enemies,”5 in January 1882 President Chester A. Arthur 
offered Taft the post of collector of internal revenue in the federal district headquartered in 
Cincinnati.6  A job removed from his training as a lawyer, Taft felt pressured to accept the 
position because of his father’s political status, as well as the fact that the president of the United 
States offered Taft a position at such a young age.  Fresh out of law school, Taft lacked a drive to 
pursue a serious career in the legal field.  He was undeniably bright, however, Taft attended law 
school much to his father’s prodding and pushing rather than out of his own desire.  Taft’s 
predetermined education contributed to his initial lack of interest; nonetheless, “Will Taft in time 
would happily embrace a career in law in the judiciary.”7   
In fact, despite his future career path, Taft began to resent politics as tax collector.  He 
found the work “uncongenial and . . . sometimes demeaning as well.”8  He met the realities of the 
 
3 Ibid., 9.   
4 Ibid., 10.   
5 Ishbel Ross, An American Family: The Tafts, 1678 to 1964.  (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 
1964), 8-9.   
6 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 10.   
7 Ibid., 8.   
8 Ibid., 11. 
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machine politics of Ohio, not uncommon in the late nineteenth century, head on, and found it 
undesirable.  He made clear that he “would have no part of any corrupt dealings,” and that he 
might overlook it in others, but never in himself.9  Taft had no interest in the details of politics, 
corrupt or not, simply because the process and practices did not appeal to him.  He even went so 
far as to proclaim that “‘Politics . . . make me sick.’”10  Unsurprisingly, Taft again held this 
position for a short period of time, ending it when he “convinced President Arthur of his real 
desire to begin the ‘active practice of law,’ and his resignation was accepted without rancor.”11  
However, within two years of resigning as tax collector, Taft found himself in his next 
major life change.  In 1884, his future wife, Nellie Heron, became the main focus of Taft’s life.  
They married in 1886, and “Until his death almost forty-four years after their marriage, Taft 
never wavered in his total devotion to Nellie or his total need for her encouragement and 
support.”12  Taft’s ambitions were clear from the start; he had always aspired to take center seat. 
Nellie, however, had a much different vision for her husband. 
From a young age Nellie dreamed of “marrying a future president.”13  Growing up, the 
relationship between Nellie’s parents provided evidence that a wife could influence her 
 
9 Ibid., 12. 
10 Alpheus Thomas Mason, “President by Chance, Chief Justice by Choice,” American Bar 
Association Journal 55 (1969): 35. 
11 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 12. 
12 Ibid., 15. 
13 Carl Sferrazza Anthony, Nellie Taft: The Unconventional First Lady of the Ragtime Era.  
(New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 82.   
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husband’s career in a less than positive manner.  In fact, Nellie’s father had longed to serve on 
the bench, but had to prioritize money over personal passions.  As a result, Nellie’s father lived a 
life of continual disappointment, and each painstaking refusal of appointment to the bench 
“convinced [Nellie] that the bench could never be anyplace for a husband whose wife had 
ambitions of her own for him and their family.”14  Much to Nellie’s surprise, however, “whether 
it was Nellie working on her own again (while also managing a family) or working on his career, 
Will would never tell Nellie what to do with her life.”15   Taft respected Nellie as his intellectual 
equal and career partner.  To Taft, Nellie’s opinions were of utmost importance and he often 
looked to her for guidance, advice, and reassurance.  Overall, Nellie “enjoy[ed] more influence 
over Will than anyone else within or without the Taft family.”16 
In January 1887 Governor Joseph Foraker appointed twenty-nine-year-old Taft to the 
Ohio Superior Court for an unexpired term of fourteen months, becoming one of the youngest 
judges to sit on that court.  In April of the succeeding year, Taft won election and secured his full 
term.17  Happy to be removed from Ohio politics, Taft cherished his time on the court as he 
crafted and researched his opinions.  The Ohio Supreme Court confirmed his expertise as a jurist, 
mostly upholding Taft’s opinions.  Additionally, it validated Taft’s long-term goals, allowing 
him to realize “that a judicial career would be the most rewarding goal he could attain.”18   
 
14 Ibid., 30.   
15 Ibid., 60.   
16 Ibid., 10.   
17 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 19. 
18 Ibid., 20.   
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However, in 1889 President Benjamin Harrison called Taft away from his treasured seat 
on the bench and offered him an appointment as the Solicitor General of the United States.  
Naturally, Taft moved to decline the appointment, but both Nellie and Taft’s father encouraged 
him to accept the offer.  The position of Solicitor General was not a simple one; it involved 
representing the United States in cases before the Supreme Court, advising the Attorney General, 
and even advising the President on certain occasions.  All of these duties were “areas in which 
Taft previously had not needed nor acquired any expertise.”  Taft accepted the offer, again 
allowing himself to be persuaded to accept a “position he did not really desire.”19  In his two 
years as solicitor general, he “argued a total of eighteen cases before the High Court—winning 
sixteen of them.”20   
Another opportunity awaited Taft in 1892.  Taft returned to his true calling by accepting 
an appointment by President Harrison to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Indeed, “for the 
next eight years, Taft found satisfaction and challenge in his work,” and “wrote enough opinions 
to provide indications of his judicial values.” 21  Revealing his judicial philosophy of classical 
legal thought, “Taft left his mark on the law especially in the fields of labor relations and 
industrial regulation.”22  On the Court of Appeals, “Taft moved the law forward from its current 
position.  If his opinions can be described as conservative, they represent a dynamic if not 
 
19 Ibid., 25. 
20 Ibid., 26. 
21 Ibid., 29. 
22 Jonathan Lurie, The Chief Justiceship of William Howard Taft (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2019), 2.   
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progressive conservatism, reconciling changing industrial conditions with long-held expectations 
of due process, precisely the goals of the Progressive Era.”23 
While Taft enjoyed his time on the Court of Appeals, Nellie’s dream of marrying a future 
president dwindled.  Nevertheless, Nellie’s quest toward the White House was derailed when in 
1900, President William McKinley summoned Taft to the White House.  To both Will and 
Nellie’s surprise, President McKinley “wished to appoint the Ohio jurist to the Philippine 
Commission,” in which Taft served as chief civil administrator and later as civil governor.24  
Nellie confessed that “her husband’s resignation from the circuit court was ‘the hardest thing he 
ever did,’” yet on April 17, 1900, the Taft’s set out for the Philippines.25   
Hardly a year later, President Theodore Roosevelt extended an appointment to the 
Supreme Court to his dear friend Taft.  In line with his personal character, dedication, and 
allegiance to his task at hand, Taft declined because he “felt a duty to the Filipino people at the 
time of economic crisis.”26  Roosevelt tried to appoint Taft to the Supreme Court again in 1906, 
except this time, Nellie “viewed Roosevelt’s 1906 offer of an associate justiceship as an attempt 
to take Taft out of the running for president, and she insisted that he reject it.”27  Abiding by 
Nellie’s wishes, Taft again rejected the opportunity to fulfill his lifelong dream. 
 
23 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 33. 
24 Ibid., 39. 
25 Jeffrey Rosen, William Howard Taft, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Sean Wilentz (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2018), 32.   
26 Ibid., 37.   
27 Ibid., 41.   
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Nellie’s dream of being married to the president began to take form in June 1908, when 
the “Republican Convention in Chicago nominated William Howard Taft to be its candidate for 
the president of the United States.”28  Taft hated campaigning, and “beneath a happy armor of 
avoirdupois he carried in his most sensitive heart a realization that he was not meant to be 
President.”29  Against his own inner desires, Taft won the presidency with “51.6 percent of the 
vote” thanks to the enthusiastic support of Roosevelt and the Republican Party.30   
Taft’s presidency is remembered as one of mediocrity, in which he “encountered a 
variety of setbacks and difficulties, as his judicial temperament made him a mundane contrast to 
the charisma and excitement of Roosevelt.”31  Taft employed judicial-based strategies while in 
the White House, where he “presided over cabinet meetings as if they were judicial conferences.  
He weighed all sides of an issue before reaching his verdict without consulting others.  He based 
his decisions on legal rather than political considerations.”32  Much of Taft’s agenda as president 
reflected his predecessor, and Taft vowed to “put President Roosevelt’s policies on protecting the 
environment, prosecuting the trusts, and keeping the peace on firm legal and constitutional 
 
28 Ibid., 42.   
29 Carl Sferrazza Anthony, Nellie Taft: The Unconventional First Lady of the Ragtime Era, 9.   
30 Ibid., 12.   
31 Lewis L. Gould, Chief Executive to Chief Justice: Taft betwixt the White House and Supreme 
Court (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 9. 
32 Jeffrey Rosen, William Howard Taft, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Sean Wilentz, 56.   
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grounds.”33  Often putting constitutional principles above party matters, Taft’s presidency also 
concerned free trade, tax reform, and foreign affairs—nothing out of the ordinary.    
Taft’s decline in health while in the White House reflected his loathsome attitude toward 
the position, considering Taft “had gotten very fat as president.  He now weighed in the 
neighborhood of 350 pounds, and his blood pressure had soared to dangerous levels.”34  On the 
other hand, Nellie embraced her “role as first lady with enthusiasm and style,” lavishly 
decorating the White House all while securing her reputation as an independent, intelligent, pro-
suffrage First Lady.35  To her detriment, Nellie suffered two strokes during her long-sought after 
White House years, further preoccupying the president. 
In time, while Nellie recovered from both strokes, Taft was relieved of his presidential 
duties when Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson defeated Taft in the election of 1912.  Taft 
ran against both Wilson and his failed friend, Roosevelt, in which Taft “won the fewest electoral 
votes by an incumbent president,” while Roosevelt split the vote and “won the most electoral 
votes ever received by a third-party candidate.”36  Taft welcomed defeat with open arms, and 
only “days after the election, Taft set off for a meeting in New Haven, Connecticut, where the 
president of Yale University offered him the Kent professorship of law on the spot.”37  Taft 
 
33 Ibid., 70.   
34 Lewis L. Gould, Chief Executive to Chief Justice: Taft betwixt the White House and Supreme 
Court, 10. 
35 Jeffrey Rosen, William Howard Taft, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Sean Wilentz, 61.   
36 Ibid., 104-105.   
37 Ibid., 105.   
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served as Professor of Law at Yale University from 1913 until his appointment to the Supreme 
Court.   
On Christmas Eve, 1920, President-elect Warren G. Harding met with Taft and engaged 
in an extensive conversation.  To Taft’s relief, Harding asked the question Taft waited to hear his 
entire life: “‘Would you accept a position on the Supreme Bench?’”  Taft replied with an 
ultimatum of sorts, and responded, “‘it was and always has been the ambition of my life’ and 
explained why he turned down TR’s earlier offers of such an appointment . . . ‘I could not accept 
any place but the Chief Justiceship.’”  Harding did not question Taft’s request.  However, Taft’s 
position was not secured quite yet.  At Harding’s inauguration, Chief Justice Edward White still 
occupied the center seat despite serious illness and his expressed interest in holding the seat for 
Taft to “give it back to a Republican Administration.”38  Upon March’s arrival, Taft grew 
restless, going as far as visiting the ailing Chief Justice.  To Taft’s disappointment, White 
mentioned nothing of retirement in Taft’s visit; nevertheless, Taft would only have to wait two 
months longer.  May 19, 1921 Chief Justice White died at the age of seventy-five.  On June 30, 
Harding finally “sent Taft’s nomination to the Senate, which did not even bother to refer it to the 
Judiciary Committee.”39  Taft’s lifelong pursuit of the chief justiceship became a reality.     
A Brief History of the United States Federal Courts and Federalism 
Prior to examining Taft’s reforms and the effects of these reforms, a brief overview of the 
history of the federal courts prior to Taft’s chief justiceship and the federal courts’ relationship 
with federal power is warranted.  The ever-shifting nature of the United States federal courts 
 
38 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 190. 
39 Ibid., 191.  
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contributes to the circumstances surrounding Taft’s judicial reform movement, as well as the 
long-term effects of Taft’s changes. 
The debate surrounding the appropriate power of the federal judiciary has long been 
disputed, beginning with the Founders in the formation of the United States.  Alexander 
Hamilton recognized this ongoing debate and addressed the power of the federal judiciary in the 
Federalist Papers, specifically papers 78 and 81.  In Federalist 78, Hamilton deemed the judicial 
branch as the “least dangerous” of the three branches while defending the structure and function 
of the judiciary.  He acknowledged that life tenure of judges and the appointment system seemed 
concerning considering it protected the judiciary from political manipulation and democratic 
accountability.  Despite this criticism, Hamilton argued that this structure proved necessary to a 
republican style of government to prevent the judiciary from being overshadowed by the other 
two branches.40  In Federalist 81, Hamilton addressed the inferior federal courts which may be 
established in the future by the legislative branch.  He defended the necessity of the inferior 
federal courts, arguing that without such federal courts, the state courts would handle national 
issues improperly as a result of regional biases.  He further defined the authority and jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, noting that the inferior federal courts were designed to handle cases of 
original jurisdiction, while the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is of law and fact.41   
Hamilton recognized that the Constitution established the structure and vague jurisdiction 
of the federal judiciary without truly defining its role or purpose in regard to the extent of power 
the judiciary holds.  However, Hamilton “predicted ‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so 
 
40 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers No. 78.   
41 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers No. 81.   
Michalak  12 
compound a system, can liquidate the meanings of all the parts, and can adjust them to each 
other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.’  Nearly two centuries later, observers are still 
pointing to the maladjustments and imbalance within the federal system.”42  Hamilton made his 
support for judicial review clear in Federalist No. 78, further upholding the idea that the Court 
must settle into its power.   
Hamilton’s political opponent, Thomas Jefferson, held a different view of the federal 
judiciary’s power.  Jefferson “thundered against the power of the Supreme Court and the 
construction it was putting upon the Constitution in exalting and broadening the national 
sovereignty and minimizing the power of the States.  But it was all to no purpose, and he had the 
irritating disappointment of finding his own appointees . . . concurring in the views of [Chief 
Justice] Marshall and making the decisions of the Supreme Court consistent from the first in a 
Federalistic construction of the fundamental instrument of government.”43  Although support for 
a developing and expanding third branch was not agreed upon by the Founders, this debate 
suggests that Article III’s vague verbiage was not only intentional, but was implemented to allow 
future generations decide how to interpret and apply the language of the federal judiciary.   
Following the official founding of the United States, three stages of judicial federalism 
ensued as outlined in historian Edward F. Mannino’s book, Shaping America: The Supreme 
 
42 John W. Winkle III, “Dimensions of Judicial Federalism,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 416 (1974): 75.   
43 William Howard Taft, “In Order to Form a More Perfect Union,” in The Collected Works of 
William Howard Taft: Volume V Popular Government and the Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme 
Court, ed. David H. Burton (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 89.   
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Court and American Society, with two stages leading to and including Taft’s tenure on the Court.  
Ranging from roughly “1789 to the outbreak of civil war in 1860,” the first phase of judicial 
federalism “sought to build federal judicial power and encourage the growth of American 
commerce under Chief Justices John Marshall and Roger Taney.”44  In the Court’s earliest days, 
its focus on federal power consisted of protecting the federal taxing power, exercising 
jurisdiction over states, declaring state legislation unconstitutional, enforcing the supremacy 
clause, interpreting the powers of the federal government, and building and establishing national 
commercial law.45 The power of judicial review as established in Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
served as the most expansive provision of the era, equipping the Court with a powerful tool 
extracted from the Constitution’s vague outline of judicial power.46  Marshall’s legacy is 
reflected in this early period of the federal courts, establishing Marshall as a justice who 
prioritized and “kept Federalist principles alive long after the Federalist Party itself had 
disbanded.”47 
The first era of judicial federalism also dealt with the problem of slavery, further 
classifying slavery as a federal problem.  The Court’s infamous decision of Dred Scott v. 
 
44 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society.  
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), 2. 
45 Ibid., 9. 
46 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).   
47 Howard Gillman, “Party Politics and Constitutional Change,” in The Supreme Court and 
American Political Development, ed. Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006), 144.   
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Sandford (1857) invalidated the Missouri Compromise, rendered slaves as property under the 
Fifth Amendment, and further denied the citizenry of African Americans whose ancestors were 
imported to the United States through the slave trade.48  The reach of the federal judiciary in this 
case established unified, national case law regarding the status of slaves in the United States, 
further complicating the relationship between the states and the federal government in regard to 
slavery.49 
Both Marshall and Taney provided significant contributions to the formation of national 
commerce and economic development.  The Marshall Court paved the way for interstate 
commerce, “announcing an expansive definition of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, 
which conferred the power on Congress, among a long list of other subjects, ‘to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States.’”50  This expansive reading in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 
established the foundations of the Commerce Clause, which has since been extensively 
broadened.51  In addition, despite the fact that Taney’s reputation as Chief Justice is stained from 
the egregious Dred Scott decision, “Taney is generally ranked by legal historians and other 
professionals as one of a handful of great justices . . . Taney’s careful balancing of federal and 
states’ rights was acclaimed in the commercial law area.”52  Taney’s high ranking is best 
 
48 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).   
49 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 32-34. 
50 Ibid., 46. 
51 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).   
52 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 31. 
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reflected in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837).53  In this case, the Court upheld the 
Warren Bridge Charter under the Contracts Clause, serving as a “break from the Marshall era’s 
polestar interpretation of the Contracts Clause to protect the ‘adventurers.’  In its place a more 
subtle and nuanced view emerged, recognizing other interests,” namely property rights, “worthy 
of protection . . . for a growing economy and a nation of diverse interests.”54   
The second era of judicial federalism spanned from 1865 to 1960, and “began as a period 
of relative passivity, in which the Court regularly limited federal and state regulation of all forms 
of commercial activity.”55  The federal courts’ role then transitioned to the “almost exclusive 
responsibility for protecting rights” and civil liberties.56  Prior to the inundation of cases 
regarding economic liberty, the introduction of the Civil War Amendments provided ample 
opportunity for a major shift in judicial federalism.  The first major shift in this era came with the 
decision of the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873).  Serving as the first interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court established that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed rights 
in areas controlled by the federal government, limiting the reach of the clause.  More 
specifically, the rights sought to be protected by the butchers bringing suit under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause “were not rights of a citizen of the United States, and the Louisiana law 
was a valid exercise of the police power which” belongs exclusively to the States.57  In addition 
 
53 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).  
54 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 50. 
55 Ibid., 2. 
56 Alan Tarr, “The Past and Future of New Judicial Federalism, Publius 24 (1994): 65.   
57 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 63. 
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to Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the majority in Slaughterhouse restricted the reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, unlike other major cases of the era.58   
The Court then turned its attention to the “emergence and growth of industrial 
capitalism,” further limiting the power of the federal and state government through the use of 
substantive due process.59  Best exemplified in Lochner v. New York (1905), a prevailing judicial 
attitude from the late 1890s to 1937 placed emphasis on the idea that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment also provided substantive protections to corporations and other persons against 
arbitrary legislative action.”  In fact, in this period, “some 184 state laws were struck down under 
the Due Process and Equal Protections clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60  Although 
Lochner-era decisions struck down regulations and limited the reach of the federal government, 
the judiciary still exerted federal power.  Instead of handing down decisions that favored federal 
power in a broad sense, justices wielded federal power from the bench through legal reasoning 
and judicial activism.  As Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. argued in his dissenting 
opinion, the case had been decided on an economic theory with which a large portion of the 
country disagreed.  By inserting its own set of opinions, the majority perverted the meaning of 
“liberty” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment.61 
The Court handed down the Lochner decision during the early stages of the Progressive 
Movement.  As a result, Progressives and the public opposed the Court’s decision, viewing it as 
 
58 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
59 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 75, 85. 
60 Ibid., 85. 
61 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).   
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a judicial obstacle to social reform.62  In time, it became clear that “Lochner stood at odds with 
certain other cases expressing a broader federal power to regulate harm through the commerce 
power, and in the next decade, there would be significant opportunities to rethink the impact of 
protection on citizenship.”63  Significantly, “Lochner did not usher in a reign of terror for social 
legislation.” 64  In fact, only a few years after Lochner, the Court handed down two cases, Muller 
v. Oregon (1908) and Bunting v. Oregon (1917) that broke away from traditional Lochner-era 
rulings.65  Muller sustained a maximum-hour law for women, while Bunting buried Lochner 
“without even citing it, upholding a conviction for employing a worker in a flour mill more than 
ten hours in a day without paying overtime.”66 
Although the downfall of Lochner seemed imminent, President Harding made four 
crucial appointments to the High Court during his short presidency.  After Chief Justice White’s 
death in 1921, Harding appointed Taft to take White’s place at center seat.  In 1922 Harding 
appointed George Sutherland and Pierce Butler to the Court, followed by Edward Sanford in 
 
62 Edward F. Mannino, Shaping America: The Supreme Court and American Society, 88. 
63 Carol Nackenoff, “Constitutionalizing Terms of Inclusion,” in The Supreme Court and 
American Political Development, ed. Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006), 389.   
64 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) 49-50.   
65 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).   
66 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986, 
103.   
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1923.  Most notably, however, “two of his appointments—Sutherland and Butler—joined with 
two justices already serving on the Court—Willis Van Devanter and James McReynolds—to 
form what pro-New Deal commentators would call ‘The Four Horsemen’ for their apocalyptic 
opposition to government regulation of business.”67   
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia (1923) exemplified typical 
decisions favoring economic liberty carried by the Four Horsemen.  In this case, the Court held 
that the guarantee of minimum wage to women and children employed in the District of 
Columbia violated liberty of contract under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.68  
In his majority opinion, Sutherland revived the use of substantive due process, with Lochner 
forming “the cornerstone of Justice Sutherland’s opinion.”69  In fact, even “Chief Justice Taft, a 
consensus builder who filed only four dissenting opinions in his eight years on the Court,” 
dissented in this case, arguing that Lochner had been overruled by Bunting, and that no real 
difference existed between regulating hours and wages.70  For the remaining tenures of the Four 
Horsemen, liberty of contract and substantive due process served as common judicial tools.  
Trust busting also preoccupied a portion of the Court’s attention in the second era of 
judicial federalism.  Enacted on July 2, 1890, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act outlawed monopolistic 
business practices, stemming from concerns regarding various agrarian movements, the rapid 
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growth of the railroad business, and interests favoring small businesses.71  Beginning with 
United States v. E.C. Knight Company (1895), the Supreme Court has long debated the 
guidelines of the statute.  Delivered by Chief Justice Melville Fuller, the Court declared the 
Sherman Act constitutional in Knight.  However, the Court limited the reach of the Act by 
deciding that it did not apply to manufacturing; this decision allowed the monopolization of 
manufacturing to continue—in this case, refining sugar.72  The decision in Knight again provided 
insight into the Court’s attitude toward federalism: “Fuller’s opinion stressed the importance 
from a federalist perspective of preserving some power in the states to regulate monopoly, 
stating that ‘it is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power . . . 
should always be recognized and observed, for, while the one furnishes the strongest bond of 
union, the other is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the states as required by our 
dual form of government.’”73 
The Historical and Political Context of Taft’s Supreme Court Tenure 
Both from the bench and through separation of powers, the factors contributing to the 
balance of federal judicial power formed the context in which Taft would craft his reforms.  The 
history of the federal courts provides the necessary context to measure Taft’s exercised power as 
Chief Justice as contrasted to his predecessors.  In addition to the historical context of the United 
States federal courts as a whole, the historical context surrounding Taft’s Supreme Court tenure 
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influenced various decisions made by Taft and his brethren as well as contributed to the outcome 
of the federal court reforms Taft pursued.  Wedged between both World Wars and in a time of 
intense government expansion, the 1920s proved to be one of the most evolutionary and 
culturally rich eras in United States history. 
Generally, citizens’ lifestyle changes in the 1920s reflected “the new age of film, radio, 
motor cars, and consumer capitalism,” and Americans had more leisure time than ever before.74  
The impact of the radio was profound, and for the first time in history “one person with a 
microphone could speak to many, influence them, and perhaps change their lives.”75  As a result, 
public interest was not as focused on politics in the early twenties as it was in the war years, and 
news of judicial reform proved uninteresting to news outlets and the population alike.  Thus, Taft 
squeezed in reform without the intense scrutiny of the general population.  Moreover, “public 
disinterest [in politics] was partially attributable to the recovery of the American economy which 
had begun around late 1923.  Unemployment had fallen to 5 percent and average earnings had 
started to rise slowly.”76  With more spending money in their pockets, the release of wartime 
pressure, and increased opportunity for leisure time activity, the population had other interests to 
tend to rather than politics.   
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In contrast to stereotypical interpretations of the Roaring Twenties, Prohibition 
dominated 1920s popular culture.  The Eighteenth Amendment banned the sale, production, and 
distribution of alcohol in the United States, while the 1919 Volstead Act enforced this ban.  In 
addition to the cultural impact of Prohibition, it also “represented the greatest expansion of 
federal regulatory authority since Reconstruction.”77  Paired with progressive movements of the 
time, Prohibition expanded the power of the federal government contrary to popular culture 
expectations. 
Prohibition followed the long-term efforts of the Temperance Movement, a moral-based 
crusade against intoxication and the negative effects of alcohol on society and the larger culture.  
Christian groups led the movement, “which believed that beer, bourbon, and other alcoholic 
drinks led not only to intoxication and addiction but the erosion of family bonds and the 
abandonment of Christian values.”78  A culmination of decades of campaigning, lobbying, and 
enlisting support through the Temperance Movement produced the Volstead Act; however, 
politicians were not united on the subject.  In fact, “The political will for enforcement of the 
Volstead Act was also weak from the outset and disagreements cut across party lines.  Pro-
temperance progressives and some conservatives were happy to prod public morality along the 
‘right’ path through federal legislation.”79  Eager to appease the growing movement, politicians, 
at face value, subscribed to the demands of the various temperance groups.  In reality, however, 
 
77 Robert Post, “Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” William and Mary Law Review 48 (2006): 2. 
78 Niall A. Palmer, The Twenties in America: Politics and History, 7.   
79 Ibid., 10.   
Michalak  22 
politicians and the public alike were unsure of the new legislation, even outraged by its far-
reaching qualities.  A New York Times article from 1929 explains the sentiment surrounding the 
Volstead Act nine years after enactment:  
The Volstead act has not been enforced, and it is perfectly plain that it can not be except 
by such tyranny and cruelty as will destroy the spirit of a free people . . . It is no part of 
the duty of the State to enforce an unjust and unpopular law . . . Laws should be like 
clothes.  They should be made to fit the people whom they are meant to serve.  A wise 
and humane statesman would never undertake to enforce obedience to a statute which 
was met by the strong resistance of the nation. 
 
The author of the article goes on to complain that all of those in favor of Prohibition were 
hypocrites, and that “in any country where people have any power, laws are often repealed by 
disuse.” 80   
Political leaders themselves doubted the far-reaching nature of the Act, and “Available 
evidence suggests that . . . President [Coolidge], like Harding, Mellon, and William Howard 
Taft, doubted the wisdom of ‘legislating morality’ and considered the Volstead Act intrusive and 
unworkable.”81  Justices on both sides of the political spectrum on the Taft Court ruled in favor 
of Prohibition despite personal beliefs, which “contributed to the growing fear that the positive 
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law of Prohibition was somehow incompatible with deeply held national values . . . because it 
was proliferating wildly and increasingly detached from tradition and custom.”82 
In addition, as a result of the unprecedented reach of the Eighteenth Amendment and 
Volstead Act, “the nation lacked the institutional structures necessary independently to 
implement the Eighteenth Amendment.”83  As a result, citizens circumvented the law, opened 
speakeasies, bootlegged excessive amounts of liquor, forged prescriptions, and made their own 
alcohol at home.   
Available evidence reveals that the Act achieved what was originally intended to a 
degree; however, it exacerbated other issues in urban areas.  Prohibition violations varied by 
population density, with different strategies and viewpoints maintained in rural areas compared 
to cities.  Rural populations assumed that Prohibition was a result of urban institutions, 
particularly saloons, believing that “saloon keepers encouraged drinking to excess,” while 
“workers spent wages that should have been going to support their families.”84  As a result, rural 
inhabitants perceived their at-home drinking as morally acceptable, and “view[ed] their own 
continued drinking as legal and harmless.”85  The “Volstead Act outlawed naturally fermented 
cider and wine only if proven intoxicating,” an ambiguous and difficult standard to police in 
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rural areas.  Most violations of the Volstead Act centered in urban areas and extended outward 
from city centers through smuggling, allowing bootlegging to become a “lucrative business in 
the 1920s since a substantial number of people, especially in big cities, were prepared to ignore 
the prohibition law.”86 
Prohibition also brought various issues to the federal courts, not only flooding their 
criminal dockets, but also presenting various constitutional questions.  It “required progressives,” 
on and off the bench, “to question the proper boundaries of the administrative state.”87  
Additionally, federal district courts became burdened with criminal trials, and within a decade 
“prohibition violators accounted for over one-third of the 12,000 inmates of federal prisons while 
a glut of prohibition cases overloaded the courts.”88   
Conservative Republicanism dominated party politics of the twenties, with which Taft 
identified.  He described himself as a “A lifelong Republican” and a “believer in ‘progressive 
conservatism.’  While this description may be less than accurate when applied to his later years 
as Chief Justice, it has some validity for his six selections to the High Court, as well as for his 
presidency as a whole.”89  Although not fully applicable to Taft’s opinions on the Supreme 
Court, progressive conservatives placed “a strong emphasis on the rights of property, a deep 
attachment to liberty of contract, a distrust of regulatory legislation, and repeated emphasis on 
 
86 Ibid., 17.   
87 Robert Post, "Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” 20.   
88 David Kyvig, Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1939: Decades of Promise and Pain, 1.   
89 Jonathan Lurie, William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative, 120.   
Michalak  25 
the limited power of the judiciary.”90  Throughout his career, Taft fell in line with all of these 
values, placing particular emphasis on the limited power of the judiciary as evidenced in Adkins.   
In regard to his presidency, chief justiceship, and reform efforts, Taft preferred the 
explicit powers of the Constitution and leaned against implied powers.  As opposed to his 
presidential predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft viewed the Constitution as a firm check on 
his authority, both as president and as Chief Justice; Roosevelt viewed the Constitution as a set 
of rules intended to be stretched to their limits.  Other popular adherents of progressive 
conservative thought included “Robert M. La Follete, and George W. Norris” who “looked to 
government to ameliorate defects in the fabric of society.”91  All three of these politicians looked 
upon judicial activism with disdain, and preferred achieving reform through legislation or 
executive action.   
The United States political landscape changed significantly when in 1920 women gained 
suffrage through the Nineteenth Amendment.  This Amendment proved to be a monumental 
event that introduced the other half of the population to the political conversation in the United 
States.  However, because of a variety of cultural and gender-based circumstances of the period, 
women did not produce high turnout rates at the polls until the 1930s.  In fact, it was the “better 
educated middle class urban women” who rushed to the polls, leaving immigrant women and 
women of color behind.  Realizing that the female vote still carried less weight than their 
counterparts, male politicians often turned away from women’s issues, leaving suffrage as a 
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mere opportunity in the twenties, rather than measurable change.  Suffrage improved “women’s 
general image, but it was far from clear that it elevated their individual circumstances.”92  
Additionally, women of color remained disenfranchised, therefore voting the least of all and 
negatively influencing the overall voter turnout rate for women.93   
Politics in general in the early twenties experienced a shift in political direction, with 
Republicans regaining control of the House and Senate for the 66th Congress.  A sharp contrast 
from the Wilson administration, “Republican conservatives in Congress were determined that 
one of the campaign’s major debates would focus upon the burgeoning size and power of the 
federal government.  The war had permitted the Wilson administration to exert extensive control 
over almost all aspects of economic and social life to a degree unseen since the Civil War.”94  
The White House shared this sentiment, with Harding declaring that “the country, after years of 
upheaval, needed ‘not nostrums but normalcy,’” serving as the slogan of the Harding 
campaign.95  In fact, Harding succeeded in his campaign mission.  Harding emphasized limited 
government, and “except for mail delivery and prohibition enforcement” the reach of the federal 
government remained distant from citizens’ personal affairs.96   
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Although Republicans retained control of both chambers of Congress and had gained the 
White House in the election of 1920, the “sixty-seventh Congress was the most divided and 
rebellious to confront any incoming president for fifty years . . . members were disinclined to 
accept direction, either from the White House or from their own party leaders . . . Rampant 
factionalism plagued most legislative debates in 1921-3.”97  These factions consisted of ad hoc 
coalitions formed within each party, including the largest and most unified grouping, the farm 
bloc.  Southern Democrats sympathized with this group and served as the farm bloc’s closest 
ally.  However, the most influential bloc was the Republican pro-business group. 98   
Additionally, Senate irreconcilables were often divided among themselves on issues such as 
foreign policy, led by Republican Majority Leader and Chairman of the Committee of Foreign 
Relations, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.99  Taft faced an uncompromising and 
divided Congress from the outset of his reforms, presenting him with an onerous political test.   
In a shock to the nation, President Harding suddenly died of a heart attack on August 2, 
1923.  Following his death, three scandals arose from his administration including the Veterans’ 
Bureau Scandal, the Teapot Dome Scandal, and the Attorney General Scandal.100  Nevertheless, 
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his Vice President, Calvin Coolidge, stepped in his place and inherited a difficult political 
climate, eventually persevering and winning the “admiration and gratitude of the American 
people.”101  However, the political atmosphere in the White House and its political agenda did 
not change.  Coolidge decided to keep Harding’s cabinet “intact and at its first meeting . . . the 
new President confirmed that the ‘Harding program’ would be continued.”102  To Taft’s relief, in 
addition to upholding Harding’s policy plans, Coolidge endorsed and supported Taft’s reform 
measures as Harding once did.    
However, Coolidge differed from Harding in his strategies, ambitions, and political 
ability.  While “Harding had been expansive in manner and appearance, Coolidge was thin, 
quiet, and peevish . . . [but], Coolidgean conservatism, rooted in this solid, Puritan environment, 
was for more resilient than Harding’s.  It also appealed to many Americans who, in the restless 
decade of the 1920s, wallowed in nostalgia for a vanishing and over-romanticized past, even as 
they excitedly welcomed socioeconomic and cultural change.”103  Compared to the 
administrations plagued with war and depression both before and after his, the “hallmarks of the 
Coolidge era were prosperity and peace.”104  Despite his resilient political platform, Coolidge’s 
timid personality affected his ability to lead and to advocate for his agenda, considering that the 
68th Congress did not welcome the new president with accommodation in mind.  In fact, in the 
first twelve months of the Coolidge presidency, the 68th Congress failed to pass a single White 
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House-sponsored bill.105  Despite this difficulty, Coolidge settled into the presidency, and 
secured his legacy as a terse, small-government conservative. 
Desperate Need for Reform: Crowded Dockets and a Spike in Litigation 
Prior to Taft’s appointment to the Court, problems in the federal judiciary prevented the 
federal courts from functioning at their fullest potential.  One of the most pressing issues 
presented to the federal court system was the massive backlog of cases on the federal court 
dockets.  At the turn of the nineteenth century, the federal courts “highly decentralized and still 
using cumbersome procedures like automatic appeals to the Supreme Court, were lagging behind 
the pace of change across the rest of America.”106  The overburdened docket created enormous 
delays in the delivery of opinions, served as a source of stress for the sitting justices, and 
delegitimized the federal courts’ prestige and power.   
In fact, when Taft took his center seat, he “confirmed his earlier impression that . . . his 
predecessor as chief justice Edward White had been unskilled in judicial administration.  When 
Taft opened the October 1921 term, he found a backlog of almost 350 undecided cases.”107  
Massive delays in the delivery of justice existed.  In Taft’s mind and in the opinion of many of 
his colleagues and counterparts, this delay was unacceptable.  
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Taft explained the delays of the Court best in a piece published in the American Bar 
Association Journal, where Taft sought to persuade the legal community at large that reform was 
desperately needed.  He explained an observation of his:  
To be exact, I had the clerk give me the time taken between the filing of the transcript 
and the hearing of the last ten cases on the regular docket heard in the Supreme Court, 
and the average interval was 14 months and 16 days.  This is due not alone to the number 
of cases filed, but also to the fact that with the increasing number of cases in which 
emergent public interest demands that a speedy disposition be had, many cases are taken 
out of their order and are advanced.  Much of the time of the court is consumed in the 
hearing of such cases and the regular docket is delayed.108   
 
As soon as Taft began his tenure, he realized that in addition to the gift of 350 undecided 
cases that White had left him, an even larger spike in litigation was imminent.  With the influx of 
new statutes regarding commerce, labor, prohibition, and consumer safety, the impending wave 
of litigation loomed over the federal courts.  Taft recognized this, identifying numerous acts and 
explaining:  
The Anti-Trust Law, the Railroad Safety Appliance Law, the Adamson Law, the Federal 
Trade Commission Law, the Clayton Act, the Federal Employers’ Liability Law, the Pure 
Food Law, the Narcotic Law, the White Slave Law, and other acts, and finally the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, have expanded the civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of first instance to such an extent that unless something 
is done, they are likely to be swamped.109 
 
At this point, Taft knew that reform was imperative, not only to preserve the reputation and 
efficiency of his own Court, but to protect the Court’s legitimacy and ability for generations to 
come.   
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 In addition, Taft realized that to achieve the necessary reform for the federal courts, it 
would be an arduous battle.  He expressed his concerns, explaining: “When we come, however, 
to the two defects of delay and excessive cost of litigation, we have a problem much less easy.”  
He continued: “The enormous expansion of our population, of our commerce at home and 
abroad, the tremendous increase in business and in the number of transactions that call in the 
ordinary course of things for litigation and resort to the courts, have swamped a system that was 
adopted in more primitive times.”110  Through this statement, Taft made a valuable observation.  
The Founders designed the federal courts to serve rural populations in a merchant-based 
economy.  However, the vast industrialization of the United States rapidly altered its culture, and 
the federal courts fell behind the pace of the rest of the nation.  On a structural basis, the federal 
courts were ill-equipped to manage such a revolutionary shift in the United States economy and 
society.   
Taft’s inspiration to reform the United States federal courts came from not only the 
glaringly obvious shortcomings of the current system, but also from the success of England’s 
court system.  England’s industrial revolution occurred decades prior to the industrial revolution 
in the United States, providing the English courts with ample time to adjust to the rapid changes 
of society.  Taft studied their strategies, concluding that “The history of court reform in England 
contains lessons of profound importance to us in this country.”111   England’s use of  “executive 
control vested in a council of judges to direct business and economize judicial force, to mould 
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their own rules of procedure [and] . . . the consequent ease and quickness with which they 
dispose of cases” made the court system effective, successful, and economical.112  These 
components of the English courts paralleled the reforms Taft implemented, specifically the 
transformation of the chief justiceship, the expansion in the number of federal judges, and the 
clarification of the code of procedure for the federal courts.   
Federal court reform to the extent Taft pursued proved unique in the United States 
judiciary and legal sphere.  Taft admitted this reality himself, explaining that “I am far from 
being blind to the defects and the weaknesses of the profession of the law . . . Lawyers are 
frequently a conservative class.  They adhere to the things that are, simply because they are, and 
reluctantly admit the necessity for change.”113  The nature of the law—statutory law and 
common law—is based on tradition; precedent and common law are the foundations of the 
United States legal system.  Rooted in tradition and custom, components of the law tend to act in 
the same way.  Therefore, structural change in the judiciary occurs rarely, if at all.  Taft 
succeeded, first and foremost, as a result of his honest commitment to change.  Taft’s unique 
skill of “point[ing] to real problems in need of a solution” proved invaluable.114  The federal 
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courts were Taft’s pride and joy; however, Taft possessed the humility to admit that the federal 
courts consisted of burdensome procedures and constituted embarrassing inefficiency, reducing 
the federal courts capabilities.  Through his unique viewpoint and experience, Taft identified 
overdue areas of reform in the legal system and corrected these issues.   
Under Taft, the federal courts underwent reforms of great variety ranging from updating 
the judicial code to establishing a free-standing impressive Supreme Court building.  The first 
and most structural reform Taft sought and achieved was the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges Act of 1922.  After only one year as Chief Justice, Taft persuaded Congress to pass a bill 
that “provided 24 additional district court judges; granted the Chief Justice authority to transfer 
judges from overstaffed districts in one circuit to understaffed districts in other circuits; and 
established the ‘Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.’”115   
This conference has lasted, and it has become known as the Judicial Conference.  At the 
time Congress passed the Act, the conference consisted of the Chief Justice, the Attorney 
General, and the senior circuit judges, in which they met to discuss “required reports from 
district judges and clerks as to the business in their respective districts, with a view to making a 
yearly plan for the . . . judicial force of the United States in those districts all over the country 
where the arrears are threatening to interfere with the usefulness of the courts.”116  This Act 
provided the federal courts with more effective communication for the first time, and as a result, 
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facilitated teamwork across the different levels of federal courts as well as the different federal 
circuits.   
Prior to the creation of the Judicial Conference, “the federal court system represented a 
number of mini judicial fiefdoms, with most state district lines as their boundaries.”  For the 
most part, each federal court in each respective circuit acted independently of each other, 
carrying out business within their individual hierarchies.  It is true that “Congress created a 
hierarchy of courts but not of judges.”  The condition of the United States federal courts prior to 
and during Taft’s tenure reflected this structural setback; burdened by cases, circuits with major 
cities fell behind the pace of the rest of the United States, but sparsely populated circuits had a 
surplus of judges.  Indeed, “this inflexibility as well as the unfortunate effects of an excessive 
localism” prompted Taft to seek remedy.117 
In addition, the structure of the Municipal Court of Chicago served as inspiration to Taft 
in constructing his Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.  He spoke on its success to further 
persuade his colleagues to back his reform, explaining that “You in Chicago have had your city 
courts under some such organization as this, and I understand that it has worked well.  There is 
not the slightest reason why into judicial work we should not introduce some simple and primary 
principles of business dispatch.”118  The fact that an institution already existed in the United 
States that practiced a centralized form of executing business vindicated Taft’s ideas.  The 
Municipal Court of Chicago organized “under the direction of a Chief [where] . . . the associate 
justices are massed at one point or another in respect of the litigation pending so that the 
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increased speed in the disposition of cases is shown by the statistics to be marked and most 
satisfactory.”119  In time, Taft nearly replicated this structure through the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges Act of 1922.  
This Act also expanded the power of the office of the chief justice and created a concrete 
definition of the role.  Understanding the chief justice as the head of the judicial branch “seems 
uncontroversial today, when we are accustomed to seeing the chief justice testify annually before 
Congress on the state of the judiciary, but it was distinctly peculiar in 1921.”  Taft entered the 
Court at a time when the justices saw themselves as equals, with the chief justice being simply 
the first among equals.  However, Taft sought to implement “executive principle” in the judicial 
branch.120  The 1922 Act accomplished his goal.  This Act solidified the role of the chief justice 
as the head of the judicial branch, establishing he or she as leader of the Judicial Conference.  
More significantly, however, it expanded the power of the chief justice dramatically; for the first 
time, the chief justice possessed the power to transfer district judges from circuit to circuit.   
In addition to the establishment of the Judicial Conference and the expansion of the role 
of the chief justice, this Act added 24 additional district judges, again expanding the reach and 
power of the federal judiciary.  Overall, this Act united the federal courts and established a 
culture of communication and unity across the federal judiciary.  Taft lobbied for additional 
district court judges not only because they were needed to tackle the ever-growing docket of 
cases, but also to fulfill the “usual accoutrements of local patronage and political 
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considerations.”121  Remnant of his political past, this adjustment is one example in which Taft 
reformed the federal courts to his own advantage, yet he did so in a manner that did not unsettle 
too many important stakeholders in the federal courts. 
But these additional judgeships were beyond the typical addition of extra seats on the 
federal bench.  Taft envisioned “what he had once described as a ‘flying squadron’ of district 
court judges who could be dispatched to various locales where the need for additional jurists 
were manifest.”122  In the 1920s, a suggestion to spread the chief justice’s power to federal courts 
across the United States was extraordinary.  This would provide the chief justice with the ability 
to transfer judges from circuit to circuit altered the power of the federal judiciary, and Taft 
justified this expansion by explaining, “but already there has been introduced in a limited way 
the practice of using judges from one circuit and one district in another, and there is no reason 
why this principle should not be extended.”123 
He further defended this provision by outlining its purpose, explaining that “if the judicial 
force seems inadequate, then if business is not disposed of, it will be entirely easy to know how 
many judges should be added and in what districts and circuits they should be appointed.”124  
Judicial administration served as the cornerstone of Taft’s chief justiceship, and his flying 
squadron of judges further exemplified that vision.  With additional judges, business would be 
handled more efficiently and in a timelier manner.  The chief justice’s oversight on the federal 
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courts also provided the opportunity for increasing accountability of the lower federal court 
judges, which, in turn, increased productivity.   
However, even after the great accomplishment of the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges Act of 1922, Taft pushed his power as chief justice even further.  To accomplish his 
agenda, “Taft was unwilling . . . to regard the conference as the exclusive voice of the judiciary.”  
In fact, he brought his ideas for reform straight to Congress on multiple occasions.  Contrary to 
the traditional role of chief justice, Taft believed that the chief justice should also serve as the 
“national spokesperson for the cause of the administration of justice,” and in turn, Taft made an 
effort to maintain his presence in Congress to discuss matters that were better solved outside of 
the conference.125  He was not shy in his lobbying efforts, bringing his fellow members of the 
Court along with him to present their opinions and goals.  Judicial executive action of this sort 
was unheard of prior to Taft’s tenure, which further expanded and redefined the role of the chief 
justiceship.   
The next major reform was the Judiciary Act of 1925, also known as the Judges’ Bill.  
Previously, the Act of 1891 introduced discretionary jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over 
certain types of appeals.  The Act of 1916 further expanded the discretionary power of the Court 
in regard to state court judgements.126  The Judiciary Act of 1925, however, “convert[ed] much 
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of [the Supreme Court’s] obligatory jurisdiction into certiorari,”127 and now required that “no 
case of any kind can be taken from the Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the 
United States without application for a certiorari.”  It also required that “Obligatory appeals 
from all other courts . . . except from the federal district courts in a limited class of cases and 
from the state courts, are also abolished.”128  The exceptional cases Taft referred to are 
proceedings marked as original suits but are incidental to its appellate jurisdiction, including 
“applications for writs of mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and habeas corpus.”  In addition, 
Taft recognized and preserved the cases that Congress cannot change the jurisdiction of under 
Article III Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which included “cases affecting 
Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls and those in which a state is a party.”129 
Taft viewed obligatory jurisdiction in the Supreme Court as one of the many sources of 
the Court’s lethargic tendencies, and reducing this jurisdiction served as a foolproof solution.  
Taft argued that as the highest court in the nation, as the court of last resort, and a third branch of 
the federal government, the Supreme Court need not hear every appealed case, explaining that 
“‘no litigant is entitled to more than two chances’ . . . In order to gain yet another review, ‘there 
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must be significant legal issues lurking within the litigation.’”130  Significantly, “the Judiciary 
Act of 1925 gave the Court near-complete control over its docket for the first time in history.”131  
Introducing the writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court alleviated much of the backlog of cases 
on the Supreme Court, freeing docket space for notable cases involving compelling 
constitutional questions.   
Perhaps Taft’s greatest achievement, the Judiciary Act of 1925, “represented a 
fundamental transformation of the role of the Supreme Court.”132  Scholars view the Supreme 
Court’s use of discretionary jurisdiction as a necessary component of the Supreme Court’s 
function in United States public policy today.  The revolutionary idea of the Court’s reliance on 
discretionary jurisdiction has grown to become the norm in the United States federal court 
system, and out of all the changes Taft initiated, this reform had the greatest impact on the role of 
the Supreme Court.   
Not only did the burdensome appeals system add cases to the Supreme Court’s docket, 
but, according to Taft, it also hurt the poor litigant.  The damage to the poor litigant and the 
reduced access to justice motivated Taft to initiate reform, where he admitted that “If we could 
remedy the delay and reduce the cost of litigation, there would be very little practical reason to 
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complain of our judicial system.”133  To elaborate, Taft argued that “too many appeals impose an 
unfair burden on the poor litigant.  Gentlemen, speed and dispatch in business are essential to do 
justice.”134  The tremendous backlog in cases created a lengthy waiting period, and the longer the 
litigant had to wait, the larger the accumulation of legal fees and other detriments became.   
In addition, Taft pointed out that the current “statutes defining the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court and of the circuit courts of appeal are not as clear as they should be.  It is 
necessary to consult a number of them in order to find exactly what the law is.”135  It is obvious 
that Taft favored efficiency.  The elaborate and confusing language served little purpose; Taft 
goes on to explain that the design of the statutes consisted of a trap for counsel in which many 
got caught.  Therefore, Taft found it necessary not only to clarify the existing language on the 
matter, but also to “remove all technical penalties for mistaken appellate remedies.”136  These 
adjustments made the appeals system more accessible to all, litigant and counsel alike.  In this 
respect Taft ascribed to traditional conservative judicial reform, which emphasizes “Economy, 
efficiency, speedy justice, and inexpensive litigation.”137  Above all else, Taft entrenched his 
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reforms in practicality and efficiency, in which he “intended to streamline the judicial process 
and make the administration of justice cheaper, quicker, and more predictable.”138   
Perhaps one of the most obvious changes to the federal court system was the 
establishment of a free-standing Supreme Court building.  In his final two terms on the Court, 
Taft worked tirelessly to convince Congress to appropriate the necessary funds for the building.  
In fact, “it became something of an obsession for him.” 139  Despite his failing health, Taft yet 
again used his talent for reform to persuade his connections how badly the building was needed.  
Taft succeeded in his last mission of judicial reform and improvement.  He lobbied for and 
secured the funds to construct the separate building, “allowing the justices to move from the ‘old 
Senate chamber’ to the classic marble structure that graces Washington today.”140  
The Court and its justices needed a proper home.  The old, cramped, Senate chamber 
complicated the justices’ work, and Taft and his brethren recognized that.  The old Senate 
chamber provided “no chambers for the justices . . . their robing room was across the hall from 
the courtroom . . . [and] the court conference room was so short of space that its books were 
piled high on shelves so as to virtually be out of reach.”141  As mentioned before, the litigation 
brought by the turn of the century and the 1920s itself overloaded the Court’s docket even with 
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efficient judicial administration.  Due to this influx and the nature of the Court itself, the ever-
growing paperwork, records, and decisions could not continue to fit in the old Senate chamber.   
In addition, the Supreme Court justices were not particularly young.  Specifically, 
Associate Justice Harlan Stone struggled to navigate the close working quarters of the old Senate 
chamber and wrote to Taft complaining about the difficulties of the inadequate office space.  Taft 
shared Stone’s concerns, and in addition to the impracticality of the space, Taft believed that “as 
a coequal component of the federal structure, the judiciary and in particular his court deserved an 
appropriate home.”142  In order to establish the federal judiciary as the true third branch of the 
United States government with the same appreciation and esteem as both the executive and 
legislative branches, it follows that the Court must have a proper place to call home.   
Taft moved to make his goal a reality and after securing the funds from Congress, he 
selected prominent American architect Cass Gilbert for the construction and design of the 
building.  Again, Taft used his connections to his advantage in this choice, considering that Taft 
“shared not only Gilbert’s devotion to the Republican Party, but also his love of majestic 
grandeur as a characteristic of his civic structures,” as well as the fact that “Taft considered 
Gilbert a close personal friend.”  Taft chose Gilbert not only out of close connection, but also for 
their shared love of grand white marble structures, hoping to cause a reaction against the “silly 
modernistic movement” popular in the 1920s.143 
To Taft’s detriment, he succumbed to his poor health before he could ever see the 
completed structure stand.  However, he still played a significant role in its development prior to 
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his death.  During his last term on the bench, Taft viewed a model of Gilbert’s design, learned 
about Gilbert’s intended innovations, and observed drawings of the structure.144  Indeed, Taft 
inserted his own opinions and saw a tangible plan in front of him, and even “played a leading 
role in selecting the site.”145  Although he never saw it completed, the building is representative 
of Taft’s dedication and passion for his one true love.  He provided his Court with a proper 
home, and to Taft, the Supreme Court building served and continues to serve as a symbol of the 
Court’s true identity: “the bulwark of American society.”146  
Judicial Management, Political Connections, and Taft’s Expertise in Action 
In United States history, “As a judicial architect, Taft is without peer.  None shared his 
unconquerable desire to refashion judicial organization and procedure.”147  Considering Taft’s 
incomparable legacy, his judicial management strategies, network, personality, prior realizations 
in his career, the help of his own Court, ideology, and place in history set him apart from his 
predecessors and successors.  All of Taft’s reforms last as indicators of Taft’s long shadow and 
long judicial legacy.  Each act possessed the same underlying purpose “and common benefactor: 
both were motivated by performance concerns about efficient judicial administration, and both 
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were made possible—overcoming the ‘muted fury’ surrounding federal courts at the time—by 
Taft’s political entrepreneurship.”148   
The acts alone were not sufficient to solve the overt dilemmas of the federal courts.  Taft 
influenced fundamental functions of the Court through his day-to-day actions as Chief Justice.  
The weight of his presence on the Court can be measured by his judicial management skills.  He 
differed from other chief justices in the fact that “Taft viewed the federal judiciary as a coherent 
branch of government to be managed, and he viewed the chief justiceship as the source of that 
management.”149  Perhaps from his experience as president, through his genuine love for the 
Court, or through his deep understanding of judicial functions, “No other Chief Justice in U.S. 
history has exercised the administrative skills utilized by Taft.”150   
To further put Taft’s administrative efficiency into context, one must understand that 
chief justices are usually evaluated by how well they “administer the day-to-day functioning of 
the Court.  They are scrutinized for their handling of small emergencies and for their ability to 
dispose efficiently of routinized institutional necessities like assigning opinions or moderating 
the Court’s conferences.”  Taft exceeded the expectations surrounding these tasks.  He was 
“ruthlessly efficient, moving heaven and earth to force the Court to diminish its embarrassingly 
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large backlog of cases.”151  To illustrate his skills, Taft “persuaded by example, discouraged 
dissents, exploited personal courtesy and charm, maximized the assignment and reassignment 
powers and relied on the expertise of his associates.”152   
To accomplish the goals of the Court, Taft first “maximized the limited powers of the 
Chief Justiceship as none of his predecessors.”153  Taft’s judicial management strategies as chief 
justice did not end at the Supreme Court.  He stretched his duties across all federal courts, and 
“enthusiastically embraced a sense of generic responsibility for the overall functioning of the 
federal judiciary.”  If judges in the lower courts failed to decide cases for long periods of time, 
Taft would write letters to the judges to encourage them to remain on track.  By doing so, he not 
only allowed the administration of justice to be delivered efficiently, but he created “lines of 
accountability” that were never before seen in the federal courts.154   
Effective judicial management was not based on the ability to dispose of and delegate 
work alone.  It also depended on “the Chief’s ability to lead his colleagues without driving them 
or hurting their egos.”155  Taft exploited this remarkable ability of his, combining his “Good 
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humor, willingness to compromise, and instinctive understanding of practical psychology, [and] 
the co-operation of certain colleagues who shared his respect for the Court as an institution,” to 
mold whatever group at hand, whether it be his Court or Congress, into one of compromise, 
harmony, and adaptability.156   
Particularly in the beginning of his tenure, suppressing dissents served as one of Taft’s 
greatest skills.  He disfavored dissents and believed that an important part of the chief justice’s 
role was to promote teamwork in the Court in order to give weight and solidarity to the Court’s 
opinions.  Taft dissuaded his colleagues from dissenting in cases such as United Mine Workers v. 
Coronado, Hill v. Wallace, Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., Opelika 
v. Opelika Sewer, and FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.157   His talent in persuasion and his 
willingness to go extraordinary lengths to modify opinions to meet in the middle with his 
colleagues aided him in this ability.  Indeed, Taft “Sometimes . . . reassign[ed] an opinion to 
another Justice, or—as happened on more than one occasion—take the insights of a threatened 
dissent and turn them into an opinion that ultimately commanded the votes of the entire 
Court.”158 
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado (1922) offered one of the best examples of 
Taft’s skill.  Famous for his lengthy dissents and opinions, Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
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and Taft were often at odds with each other.  In addition to the irritation Brandeis incited in Taft 
through his obsession with facts and footnotes, “he least trusted the political and judicial values 
of Brandeis.”159  In United Mine Workers of America, the Court examined whether a labor union 
could be sued for anti-trust violations.  Through the cooperation of both Brandeis and Taft, 
Brandeis persuaded Taft that “by emphasizing the illegality of the union’s conduct . . . instead of 
the antitrust approach, one could rely on common law damages for trespass and property 
destruction.”160  Taft utilized Brandeis’s arguments and “handed down a unanimous opinion that 
built so heavily on Brandeis’s arguments that [Brandeis] never filed his proposed dissent.”161  
Through listening to his colleagues, manipulating arguments, and perfecting the art of 
compromise, Taft managed his Court in a manner that “reflected his desire not to antagonize 
anyone if at all possible, especially those in power,” as well as his hunger for efficiency and 
compromise.162 
Early in Taft’s tenure, the Court embodied a “‘norm of consensus,’ eagerly nurtured by 
the chief justice.”163  Taft was the primary consensus builder, and his “Justices preserve[d] their 
differences, but they each assume[d] that in the absence of strong reasons, these differences 
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should be put aside so that the Court [could] present a united front to the public.”164  Often the 
justices agreed to disagree, with Taft facilitating deliberations on each case.  Overall, throughout 
his eight full terms, Taft suppressed “at least two hundred dissenting votes,” eager “to stand by 
the Court.”165  This incredible number reflects his dedication to judicial management, as well as 
his talent in doing so.   
Despite Taft’s unique skills in judicial management, within the context of the time 
period, norms against dissent remained a prevailing attitude at the Supreme Court.  In fact, these 
norms were “so prominent in the 1920s that they were explicitly embraced in Canon 19 of the 
American Bar Association’s 1924 edition of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.”166  The idea of the 
Supreme Court standing in unity was not unique to Taft’s Court; nonetheless, compared to other 
chief justices and their Courts in a similar time period, Taft was unrivaled in his methodology of 
suppressing dissents and of judicial administration.  His expertise is best validated by comparing 
the unanimity rates held at conference between justices, and the rates held when delivering 
opinions: “Within the complete set of 1200 conference cases the unanimity rate, as measured by 
a unanimous vote at conference, was only 50%.  The unanimity rate for the published opinions of 
the conference cases was by contrast 86%.”167  These statistics reveal that sometime in the period 
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after the conference and before the delivery of the opinion, a steady number of justices had 
switched their vote.  During this lengthy period of time Taft persuaded his colleagues most 
effectively, often writing to them and altering his own opinions to meet the desires and concerns 
of the other justices.   
Reflected in his record of opinions, Taft disfavored dissents on a personal level.  From 
“1921 to 1929, he wrote some 249 opinions for the court and filed only three written dissents,” a 
number unheard of in today’s Supreme Court norms.168  Even so, Taft and other members of the 
Court disagreed with each other on countless occasions.   It was true that Taft “dissented less 
than a score of times while Chief Justice,” while “on rarer occasions still did he write his 
objections to a majority opinion.”169  His reluctance to outright reject his colleague’s opinions 
represented his eager to please predisposition, and his appreciation of the idea “. . . that in some 
instances, to get along, one needs to go along.”170 
However, Taft could not hold off the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis for too 
long.  Considering his declining health and aging mind, Taft’s final two terms were difficult for 
him to manage.  In a letter to his daughter Helen in 1927, Taft explained his concern: “‘I don’t 
know whether I am right about it, but I occasionally think I find greater difficulty than I used to 
in arranging the expression of my thoughts in an opinion . . . and it seems to me that it takes 
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longer than it used to.’”171  The number of dissents produced by the Court also reflected Taft’s 
decline in health.  In Taft’s final three terms, his norm of consensus “transformed into a norm of 
acquiescence, sometimes accepted willingly, in other instances with regret by the justices.”172  
Taft failed to persuade his colleagues in a compelling and enthusiastic manner as once before; 
Taft’s brethren began to comply with the Chief Justice with quiet discomfort.  However, by 
1927, Taft had lost much of the flexibility that allowed him to compromise and to craft the 
decisions of the Court by his own accord, but “Now he clung . . . to the values of ‘certainty, 
stability, and predictability’” more than ever.173  By 1929, however, Taft recognized to his 
dismay that “dissents in his court were not uncommon.”174  These facts considered, his final 
terms on the Supreme Court do not detract from Taft’s judicial impact.   
The way in which Taft oversaw the Court was not only unrivaled by other chief justices, 
but innovative for his time.  One must consider that “Today it is natural for us to conceptualize 
the Supreme Court as overseeing a co-ordinate branch of the federal government.”175  Most 
significantly, when Taft took center seat in 1921 this view of the Court was unconventional.  
Judicial scholars did not view the federal courts as autonomous entities which possessed power; 
the federal courts served as a necessary but slower cog in United States government alongside 
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the legislative and executive branches.  Taft remodeled the judiciary into a de facto co-equal 
branch of United States government and gave the federal courts the foundation to become the 
tribunals of today.   
It is clear that Taft’s impeccable judicial management skills led him to redefining the 
federal court system.  In addition, Taft’s far-reaching network and jovial nature contributed 
significantly to his success in reforming the federal courts.  Based off of his experiences as both 
a jurist and politician, “. . . Taft brought a set of reputations with him to the Court”—positive and 
negative.  His deeply rooted political connections served as an advantage, however, conceptions 
of Taft varied widely: “His time as president alone offered contrasting portraits of a would-be 
reformer, on the one hand, and a weak and bumbling amateur, on the other.”176  These negative 
opinions of Taft were few, and over time, Taft proved his opponents wrong through shifting his 
focus to the federal courts.  Upon escaping his loathed position as president, “in 1913, he 
campaigned untiringly for judicial reform.”177  Stemming from both an effort to redeem himself 
in the eyes of the public, his desire for appointment to the High Court, and his deep respect for 
fulfilling his duties as Chief Justice, Taft demonstrated his drive for federal court reform at 
numerous points in his career.  Masked by a forced political career, Taft’s true potential and 
ability rested in the judiciary, and “On the bench, he found a welcomed respite from all of 
this.”178   
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Through his cogent and convincing articles on reform and his political skills and ties, 
Taft laid old opinions of him to rest and secured his proposals for reform of his beloved federal 
courts.  To his advantage, Taft  
curried favor with the media and key interest groups.  Contacting newspaper editors 
directly, he encouraged (and received) press support of his proposals, provided written 
critiques of his opponents, urged editorials against a proposal to withdraw the Court’s 
diversity jurisdiction, and generally utilized the press to inform lawmakers and the public 
about his reforms and to repel future attacks against them.  Similarly, Taft spared no 
effort to enlist the support of organizations of lawyers, especially the American Bar 
Association.179 
In lobbying for his proposals, on his own initiative, Taft “mobiliz[ed] his numerous contacts 
within Congress.”180  Taft not only made history by being the first former President to be 
appointed Chief Justice, but, in 1921, he became the first Chief Justice to appear before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  In this hearing, Taft “appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to endorse and explain his perception of the federal judiciary.  This in itself was 
dramatic enough, but the fact that Taft was at the same time a former president made his 
testimony before the senators even more noteworthy.”181  Despite the fact that his true love was 
the judiciary, Taft wore several hats over his lifetime and while on the Supreme Court, and he 
left his mark on all three branches of government.  Both acts of reform by Congress “were 
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indeed Taft’s reforms.”182  His in-person testimony impacted Congress profoundly, and “it 
should be observed that everything he specifically sought was enacted, albeit not without some 
changes that reflected the political context in which Congress continually operates.”183 
The specifics regarding the reforms were Taft’s own ideas, however, Iowa Senator and 
Subcommittee Chair Albert Cummins contributed significantly to the process of presenting 
Taft’s bills to Congress and the subcommittee.  Taft brought his ideas to Congress, but it was 
Cummins who “suggest[ed] to Taft that he and his fellow justices take the lead in drafting a 
statute for Congress to consider.”  Cummins introduced the Judges’ Bill in February 1922 and 
served as the key spokesman for the bill once on the floor for consideration.   
Support for the bill stalled, and in “1923 . . .Taft sought the intervention of President 
Coolidge.”  Taft’s concerns for the legislation were heard, and “Indeed, in his first annual 
message to Congress, the new chief executive stated that Taft’s court ‘needs legislation revising 
and simplifying the laws governing review . . . and enlarging the classes of cases of too little 
public importance to be subject to review.’”184  Despite the support among Taft’s connections, 
efforts by Cummins, and Coolidge’s advocacy, the bill did not pass until 1925. 
Taft’s vast political and judicial experience through numerous offices and positions also 
assisted him in achieving his goals for reform.  His experiences, combined with his passion for 
the federal courts, provided him with preconceived plans about reforming the federal courts 
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before he ever arrived at the center seat.  Despite his disdain for politics, as a politician and as a 
progressive conservative, Taft understood that “‘men who enter [politics] for the purpose of 
keeping them pure and making them better are engaged in the highest duty.’”185 
Taft inferred decades prior to his first term on the Supreme Court that “Continued lack of 
public confidence in the courts will sap their foundations.”186  For Taft, this was unacceptable 
and warranted major reform to avoid this reality.  To him and to many with high regard for the 
federal courts, the federal courts “are the background of our civilization.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States is the whole background of the Government . . . It is the last resort and the final 
tribunal.”187  Taft addressed this ideal to claim further that “And that is what so emphasizes the 
importance of an improvement in our judicial procedure in this respect.”188  A common theme in 
Taft’s writings and career was the fact that the judiciary was of utmost importance: quite literally 
the backbone of the United States.  It is an understatement to say that Taft realized the 
significance of the federal courts and felt motivated to spend the latter part of his career, the most 
enjoyable and rewarding part of his life, committed to preserving the federal judiciary.   
On a more skills-based and literal level, Taft proved well equipped to exceed in his 
position as Chief Justice considering that “No president has ever been elected with as much 
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judicial experience as that possessed by Taft.”189  As reflected by his time on the Ohio Superior 
Court, on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and as Professor of Law at Yale University, Taft 
knew his way around the courtroom and was dedicated to the law and judicial procedure.  As a 
result of these experiences, Taft identified the importance of judges and justices symbolically, 
procedurally, and at the surface: “The judge retains control and pushes the trial, both because it 
usually results in a juster judgment and also because neither the time of the court nor the time of 
the jury ought to be taken up.”190  If, at their base level, the federal courts cannot deliver 
judgements or function in a timely manner, the entire system slowly disintegrates from the 
bottom up.  Maintaining the supremacy of the law in the judiciary is integral to the success of the 
United States federal court systems.191   
Political Scientist Justin Crowe best explains the impact of Taft’s prior positions by 
discussing “The fact that [Taft] approached judicial reform in a different manner—more 
measured, more strategic, and with more external support—suggests a process of political 
learning from his presidential struggles.”192  In each position he held—whether it be major roles 
like the President of the United States or minor positions like tax collector—Taft drew from each 
of his prior positions to formulate his master plan.  He “devoted much thought and energy to 
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hammering out specific correctives in judicial administration and to promoting their enactment” 
prior to and during his White House years, and “None of his predecessors had assumed such a 
large responsibility for the functioning of the federal judiciary.”193   
Outspoken about the problems the federal court systems were plagued with years before 
Taft’s appointment to the Supreme Court, Taft wrote to a friend while on the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals that “‘the condition of the Supreme Court is pitiable, and yet those old fools hold on 
with the tenacity that is most discouraging.’”194  Although speaking directly to the mental 
condition, efficiency, and age of the justices, Taft’s complaints demonstrate that he had the 
ability to be critical of the federal courts and their condition, while designing specific reform to 
alleviate the federal courts’ various headaches.  To be specific, “Groundwork for Taft’s major 
achievement—the ‘Judges’ Bill’ of 1925—had been laid when he was a circuit court judge.”195   
Not only did Taft have political support, but Taft had the immeasurable support of his 
own Court.  The typically laborious process of gaining the support of his brethren was eased by 
the fact that during his presidency, “he had selected a total of six Supreme Court jurists, more 
than any other single-term president in American history . . . although he did not know it, two of 
his choices would still be on the Court in 1921 when Taft became Chief Justice.”196  Although 
Associate Justice Mahlon R. Pitney served on the Court for only one year after Taft’s 
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appointment, Taft’s other appointee, Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter, served as an 
essential component to Taft’s reform measures.   
In 1924 “instead of testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee himself, [Taft] sent 
Justices George Sutherland (a former ABA president and Senate Judiciary Committee member), 
James McReynolds (a Democrat), and Willis Van Devanter.”197  Both Taft and Cummins 
strategically chose which justices to appear in front of the committee.  Sutherland and 
McReynolds served as obvious choices to create a diverse panel to testify in front of the 
committee.  However, considering that Van Devanter proved to be the “least productive member 
of the Taft Court,” the public and politicians in general did not perceive Van Devanter to be the 
best of justices.198  Despite Van Devanter’s general reputation, Taft recognized that Van 
Devanter’s greatest contributions occurred in conference and when debating and advising other 
members of the Court.  Although Van Devanter wrote at a sluggish pace due to his obsession 
with perfectionism, he possessed a brilliant legal mind and often settled disputes between the 
Court.  His own brethren realized that “‘public evidences of his judicial activities conceal rather 
more than they reveal what his greatest service to the Court and to the public’” was, and that at 
the conference table he served as a “‘tower of strength.’”  Indeed, he proved most impressive in 
his ability to analyze a case with complete, manifest argumentation without overlooking any 
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points or leaving any promising possibility uninvestigated.  In fact, Taft deemed him “the 
‘strongest Judge in this country’” and the most invaluable justice on the Court.199   
Van Devanter served as the Court’s expert on legal procedure and jurisdiction, and his 
testimony cleared up much of the confusion surrounding the adjustment of jurisdiction for the 
Circuit Courts and Supreme Court.  Van Devanter explained that this bill was not an upheaval of 
judicial processes; but rather a bill to correct the fragmented statutes on the appellate jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.  He emphasized that “[the bill] does not, however, take any case out of the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that is now within that jurisdiction.  It merely 
transfers certain classes of cases from the obligatory jurisdiction to the discretionary 
jurisdiction.”200   
In respect to both Taft’s opinion of dissents and the overarching teamwork of the Court, 
Taft emphasized that “It is much more important what the Court thinks than what any one 
thinks.”201  Unsurprisingly, Taft valued his colleagues’ opinions on reform of the federal 
judiciary.  He made sure to hear from multiple justices and ultimately used their opinions to his 
advantage when lobbying for his reform.  In his defense of the Judges’ Bill, he assured members 
of the ABA and Congress that “the bill has been recommended by the members of the Court only 
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after a very full consideration of the subject.  They are convinced that it is the best and safest 
method of avoiding arrears on their docket.”202 
Taft’s justices also approved of Taft and applauded his abilities on multiple occasions.  
Even Brandeis and Holmes spoke highly of Taft, although both were far removed from Taft on 
the ideological spectrum.  Holmes praised Taft’s abilities, explaining that Taft “‘is amiable and 
comfortable . . . [H]e carries things along with good humor and is disinclined to put cases over—
so we get work done.’”203  In addition, in an honest recount of Taft’s accomplishments, Brandeis 
commended Taft for his admirable qualities, which “represented ‘a great improvement over the 
late C. J. [White].’  Yet ‘it’s astonishing he should have been such a horridly bad president, for 
he has considerable executive ability.’”204  Taft maintained certain personal beliefs that were 
reflected in his efforts of federal court reform and in his courtroom management.  Taft believed 
that the “two important elements of moral character in a judge are an earnest desire to reach a 
just conclusion and courage to enforce it.”205  In this statement, Taft reinforced his theory that no 
matter one’s political allegiances, ideology, or method in deciding cases, as long as one honored 
the rule of law and stood by one’s decision, a judge possessed good moral character.  Taft 
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demonstrated his impartiality through his judicial management skills and reliance on his 
colleagues for support in his reforms.   
In addition, Taft benefitted from the fact that his reforms aligned with the popular 
political movement of the time.  Indeed, Taft’s subscription to this belief system not only 
reflected the historical context of the period, but also served as “an identity that provided 
valuable political capital.”  Taft’s ideas “were consonant with the progressive romance with the 
science of organization and management,” which aided him in convincing his colleagues.206  
Judicial management and the efficiency of the federal court system were of Taft’s highest 
priority, and he fully dedicated himself to implementing both of these concepts in a long-lasting 
way, both on and off the bench.  His dedication to organization and management further 
“revealed his lawyerlike belief that the Republican platform represented a virtual contract that 
the Party was bound to fulfill.”207  To the legal community, little about Taft’s reforms were out 
of the ordinary considering they “fell squarely into the mainstream of the conservative reform 
tradition so dominant in the world of the bench and bar.”208  Taft’s beliefs further strengthened 
his political bonds and allowed him for better support.  
It would be remiss to ignore another possible contributor to Taft’s great success in 
reform: sheer chance.  Taft’s life represented a series of fortunate events; he admitted himself 
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that he “always had [his] plate the right side up when offices were falling,” considering every 
major position Taft held was offered to him.209  His luck continued, and at the time Taft pursued 
his plan of reform, “the prevailing congressional majority agreed with the substantive 
jurisprudential commitments of the judiciary and realized that it too would benefit from 
increased judicial power.”210   
The relationship that existed between Congress and the judiciary during Taft’s tenure 
proved necessary.  Taft explicitly addressed his need for congressional approval, explaining “I 
hate to be in the attitude of a continual beggar from Congress, but I seem to have arrived at the 
court just when it was necessary.”211  In this statement, Taft acknowledged the critical timing of 
his reforms while also addressing the added benefit of the timing of his appointment to the Court: 
a culmination of the federal courts’ problems, the favorable attitude of Congress, and the lasting 
reinforcement of the Progressive Era.  It is true that “political change does not occur independent 
of preexisting institutions and structures.”212  In Taft’s case, the existing structure of both 
Congress and the judiciary of the United States government system served integral in the 
implementation of federal court reform.  
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Long-Term Impact of Taft’s Reforms on the Federal Court System 
The conditions of the federal courts at the time of Taft’s tenure made the need for reform 
evident, and the methods Taft implemented to achieve these reforms proved sufficient.  In 
addition, the positive impact these reforms had on the federal court system can be demonstrated 
by the fact that “the three main changes—the reorganization of the federal court system under 
the Chief Justice, the establishment of the Judicial Conference, the radical expansion of certiorari 
jurisdiction—persist today, more than 75 years after Taft left the Court.”213  The procedures and 
methods the federal courts use today reveal the impact of Taft’s accomplishments alone; in fact, 
“All seven chief justices who succeeded him since 1930 have utilized his administrative 
innovations, while the numerous visitors to his court still gaze with awe on what his 
determinization accomplished.”214  Indeed, all of these changes have contributed to the 
contemporary functioning of the federal court system, especially the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  Legal historian Jonathan Lurie goes as far as to argue that Taft’s reform efforts 
proved “indispensable” to the federal courts’ future.215  This notion has been confirmed; 
alongside the judicial architecture crafted by Chief Justice John Marshall, Taft’s legacy stands 
tall among other judicial powerhouses.   
The enhanced power of the chief justice and the establishment of the Judicial Conference 
both contributed to the federal courts’ autonomy and national unity—characteristics that were far 
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from the compilation of independent tribunals and judges that existed prior to Taft’s sweeping 
changes.  Of course, “As a constitutionally specified branch of the federal government,” by 
definition, “the judiciary was already autonomous in certain ways.”216  However, the judicial 
branch did not always operate as “a unified branch of government with functional 
obligations.”217  It is true of organizations, companies, or bureaucracies that they run better with 
some degree of “guidance, and the functional unification of the judiciary thus implied that the 
judicial branch be subject to ‘the executive management’ of ‘a head charged with the 
responsibility of the use of the judicial force at places and under conditions where judicial force 
is needed.’”218  Taft’s active role as chief justice and the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges Act 
of 1922 transformed the federal judiciary from one which represented fragmented states and 
circuits, to one in which the symbolic leader of the Supreme Court maintained a more active role 
in the functioning of the judiciary nationwide.    
In addition, the Judges’ Act of 1925 served as the single most important piece of 
legislation lobbied for by Taft.  Although it did not greatly influence all of the federal courts 
across the nation as did the Act of 1922, this Act changed a fundamental component of the 
Supreme Courts makeup: its jurisdiction.  The Court was no longer required to examine and 
protect “all federal rights.  Selecting only those cases that rose to national significance on the one 
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hand, and yet serving as the ultimate ‘guarantee of all federal rights’ on the other, represented 
two incompatible functions.  The Judges’ Bill sought to reconcile them.”219  This change shifted 
the Supreme Court’s purpose and character in United States government, and with discretionary 
jurisdiction, the significance of each case heard by the Supreme Court was altered. 
Legal scholar Robert Post captured the transition of the character of the Court accurately:  
No one today would think to characterize ‘more than ½’ of the Supreme Court’s cases as 
‘of no considerable importance.’  No one today would think to assert that ‘9 cases out of 
10’ on the Court’s docket ‘will decide themselves.’  Every opinion published by the 
contemporary Court is, in one way or another, consequential; every opinion is, in one 
way or another, difficult.  This does not mean that difficult and consequential opinions 
did not exist in the 1920s or before . . . My point is instead that the norms which define 
and sustain institutional practices of decisionmaking will likely be different in a Court 
whose docket contains a large proportion of ‘trifling cases’ than in a Court like our own, 
where almost every opinion is momentous.220 
 
With obligatory jurisdiction, the legal problems embedded in case law brought to the Supreme 
Court were routine and repetitive, crowded with mandatory appeals on more inconsequential 
issues involving patents and copyrights.221  At the time of adoption, Taft and his fellow justices 
envisioned the application of certiorari only “as a way of quickly dealing with claims that were 
either frivolous or plainly governed by precedent.”222  Taft admitted with confidence that in no 
case “ would a constitutional question of any real merit or doubt escape our review by the 
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method of certiorari.”223  Regardless of what Taft said, it is important to remember that like most 
in the legal community, Taft had the utmost confidence in the Court’s ability.  Throughout his 
life, Taft repeated that those in the judiciary embody the highest tier of integrity, therefore 
trusting the current Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the future with the wide discretion 
provided by the writ of certiorari.   
However, with discretionary jurisdiction, case law and the Supreme Court shifted to 
adopt more of a public-policy approach.  The Court’s decisions became a matter in which the 
entire nation, as well as the nation’s politicians, would feel the impact of each decision handed 
down.  Now, “The Supreme Court not only chooses which cases to decide, but also chooses 
which questions to answer.”224  Certiorari has equipped the Supreme Court with an agenda-
setting tool, whether or not Taft envisioned or predicted this current reality.  Justices employ the 
practice of “defensive denial,” in which “a Justice votes to deny certiorari—not due to the 
unimportance of the issue involved—but due to disapproval of the result the Court is expected to 
reach.”225   
Despite these practices, injecting politics into the Court is not a new phenomenon brought 
by the writ of certiorari.  So-called “political entrenchment” attempts began as early as the turn 
of the nineteenth century, with the Federalist Party’s introduction of the Judiciary Act of 1801.  
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The Party introduced the Act as one final attempt to retain Federalist principles in defiance of the 
incoming Jefferson administration.  Similar attempts “would be antebellum efforts by Southern 
politicians to construct five federal circuits that exclusively covered slave-owning states . . . and 
post-Reconstruction efforts by the Republican Party to transform the federal judiciary.”226   
One critical distinction exists between the political entrenchment of the past and the 
political entrenchment offered by the writ of certiorari: the branch of government exercising their 
power.  The Federalist Party, Southern Democrats, and the post-Reconstruction Republican Party 
all altered the federal judiciary through their respective authority, either legislative or executive.  
The writ of certiorari, however, vested power in the Court itself, allowing the sitting justices to 
exert political influence.  Additionally, the writ of certiorari has contributed to the heightened 
political nature of appointments to the Court.  Overall, Taft’s motivation for federal court reform 
was wholly different than the political entrenchment attempts of the Court’s past, despite the 
broad, unintended consequences of the introduction of the writ of certiorari.   
Besides the increasing political nature of the Court, effects of the Judges’ Bill can be best 
observed through statistics.  For the last decade, the contemporary Court accepted on average 
100 to 150 cases from its docket of around 7,000 each term.  Accelerated by the Act of 1925, this 
statistic signifies a fundamental shift in the way in which the Supreme Court disposes of its 
cases, and “It is clear, then, that the Supreme Court during the 1920s was in the process of 
transition from an institution that used full opinions to dispose of a significant portion of its 
appellate docket, to an institution that used full opinions to decide only an infinitesimal 
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proportion of that docket.”227  The use of full opinions provide a stark contrast to the Court’s 
previous methods further revealing the impact of this change in jurisdiction.   
This fact, paired with the shifting significance of Supreme Court case law, represents the 
legacy of the Judges’ Bill.  In addition, it is noteworthy that “In 1912 the Court decided about 
47% of its appellate cases with a full Court opinion . . . The historical average of disposing of 
about 30% of its appellate docket by full opinion, which had persisted from 1916, shrank by 
almost 50% in three years.  In the 1928 Term the Court wrote opinions in only 16% of its 
appellate cases.”228  Compared to the 1 percent of cases merely reviewed by the Court in today’s 
terms, the 1912 rate of full opinions on appellate cases is astounding.  Not only did this rate 
affect the speed in which the Supreme Court could dispose of cases, it reflected the sheer number 
of trivial issues that could be handled in the lower federal courts.   
Prior to the 1920s, justices often decided cases in a rush due to a combination of the 
speed in which cases needed to be disposed of and the number of cases heard by the Court.  
However, in the federal courts of today, judges and justices do not feel the same pressure.  To 
elaborate, the Taft Court averaged 60 days between argument and delivery of a full opinion.229  
In the 2019 term, the Supreme Court averaged 111 days between argument and delivery of a full 
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opinion, allowing the justices more time to formulate each opinion.230  In addition to Taft’s 
efficient judicial management, the justices on the Taft Court could not afford to commit lengthy 
amounts of time to formulating full opinions.  Unable to allow even minor delays in the Court’s 
docket, Taft “occasionally felt impelled ‘to take most of his cases away from [Van Devanter] and 
distribute them among other Justices’” as a result of Van Devanter’s infamous slow pace in 
writing opinions.231  The Judges’ Bill alleviated much of this pressure, allowing the number of 
cases to dwindle.  As a result, the 1925 Act enabled justices to dedicate the proper amount of 
time to observe more convoluted issues with significant and consequential problems.   
Another distinction that sets the Taft Court and other Courts prior to the Act of 1925 
apart from its contemporaries are rates of unanimity.  Suggesting a shift in the subject matter of 
the case law, “Of the 1,554 full opinions announced by the Taft Court during the 1921-1928 
Terms, 84% were unanimous.”232  In contrast, the Court’s unanimity rate of the 587 cases heard 
in the 2012-2019 terms was only 35 percent.233  The Taft Court’s docket, at least until 1925, still 
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consisted of routine mandatory appeals cases which explored similar legal questions.  In addition 
to the norms of consensus at the time, relying on precedent served as a formulaic practice in 
cases with similar facts and issues.  However, the establishment of discretionary jurisdiction 
allows the contemporary court to reject hearing repetitive cases with similar facts and issues, 
removing well-established, uncontested legal issues from the docket.  As a result, contemporary 
justices are examining the most compelling legal questions, ones in which present controversial 
topics.  
Of course, cases can reach the Supreme Court through numerous ways outside of the writ 
of certiorari.  However, the success of the Act of 1925 can best be measured through observation 
of cases accepted through granting cert.  In fact, “In the 1921 Term, 19% of the Court’s opinions 
were issued in cases that came to the Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari.  By the 
1928 Term this proportion had almost tripled, so that 55% of the Court’s opinions were issued in 
such cases.”234  The expansion of discretionary jurisdiction was evident, and the evolving 
jurisdiction of the Court can be attributed to the Act of 1925.   
Criticism of Taft’s Federal Court Reform 
By the 1920s, most Americans had become indifferent toward the federal courts.  United 
States citizens were recovering from the brutality of the First World War and adapting to the 
changing political culture around them.  These historical events created a “national mood of 
ambivalence toward centralization,” in which “Americans were simultaneously enthusiastic 
about the opportunities offered by an expanded national government and worried about 
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disintegration of local government that might accompany such expansion.”235  Postwar federal 
expansion occurred in the executive and legislative branches with the national focus resting on 
both of these areas of government.  As a result, the expansion of federal judicial power faded 
into the background.  The press had little interest in reporting on the reforms due to the lack of 
public interest “over an arcane issue—apparently of significance to only a small group of 
appellate attorneys.”236 
Although the legal community at large welcomed Taft’s reforms with open arms, Taft’s 
endeavors on occasion were met with criticism and resistance.  Fortunately for Taft, he differed 
from his predecessors in the sense that they were not “either prepared or inclined to plunge into 
the shifting Congressional tides, but years of public service had educated [Taft] in the ways of 
party politics.”237  Taft’s close network with Congress, the lasting friendships created through his 
presidency, and Taft’s general likeability enabled him to rally support for his reform and 
outweigh his enemies in Congress.  The main complaints from Congress ranged from the fact 
that the reforms “violated norms of judicial propriety” to the “speed with which it was being 
enacted.” 238  Any criticism surrounding the bills stemmed from “sensitivity to the possibility of a 
claim that a group of justices on their own cobbled together a bill, volunteered to speak on its 
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behalf, and lobbied Congress to do their bidding.”  As a result, although “such a scenario had 
minimal basis in reality, all parties to this legislation were anxious to avoid any apparent linkage 
to it.”239 
On numerous occasions, Taft welcomed criticism of the Court.  Echoing the Founders, 
Taft admitted that “the opportunity freely and publicly to criticize judicial action is of vastly 
more importance to the body politic than the immunity of courts and judges from unjust 
aspersions and attack.  Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions.”240  Taft’s 
transparency in this statement suggested that he was well aware of the conclusions his critics 
would draw from cases suggesting the unjustified expansion of federal power.  Taft was not 
willing to jeopardize his precious reforms in such a fashion.   
Taft met these objections strategically, in which he “downplayed his own role in the 
reform effort and minimized his rivalry with the Senate.”241  In this respect, Taft predicted 
potential objections to his reforms and deflected and redirected the comments of each critic.  
Indeed, Taft recognized the growing resentment toward the federal courts: “Within the last four 
years, the governors of five or more states have thought it proper in official message to declare 
that the Federal courts have seized jurisdiction not rightly theirs, and have exercised it to the 
detriment of the Republic, and to urge their respective legislatures to petition Congress for 
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remedial action to prevent future usurpation.”242  Although these criticisms stemmed from 
particular decisions of the federal courts, the negative attitudes toward the federal courts did not 
help Taft’s case for strengthening and altering the powers of the chief justice and procedural 
aspects of the federal courts.   
As a result, from the start of his reform Taft conveyed his lobbying efforts through the 
lens of practical adjustments rather than explicitly arguing for expansion of the power of the 
third branch to safeguard himself from intense criticism or resistance.  In fact, Taft argued 
against the idea that he intended to expand the power of the federal judiciary, explaining that 
genuine need for reform was the driving force in his endeavors.  He explained that “It is not a 
delegation of great power to the Supreme Court.  The court in formulating the rules will of 
course consult a committee of the Bar and committee of trial judges.  Congress can lay down the 
fundamental principles that should govern and then the court can fill out the details.  The 
procedure in the Federal Courts should be a model for all other courts.”243   
One specific objection that Taft addressed was the notion that “[the bill] gives too much 
power to the council of judges, and especially to the Chief Justice.”244  To counter this claim, 
Taft further drew from his connections, explaining that “The Attorney-General has been much 
impressed with the great increase in business in the courts, and has recommended to the 
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President and to Congress the adoption of a law which, it seems to me, will much facilitate the 
dispatch of business in the courts of the United States.”245  Through this distinction, Taft 
emphasized the fact that the origins of this bill did not arise from federal judges or justices who 
were interested in expanding their own power.  Increasing the efficiency and practicality of the 
federal courts served as the true underlying motive for creating, lobbying for, and passing both 
pieces of legislation.   
Despite various objections, in general, both bills met little pushback.  Originally 
presented to Congress in 1922, “In spite of Taft’s eagerness for quick legislative approval, as 
well as his endorsement from the president, [the Judges’ Bill] failed to emerge from the House 
committee.  Other concerns occupied lawmakers . . . it was not until February 1924 that a 
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee turned to the measure.”246  It is important to 
note that legislators pushed aside the Judges’ Bill not because of controversy, but because of 
other pressing matters, such as foreign policy, prohibition, and labor regulation.   
The first House Committee on the Judiciary hearing in 1922 regarding the Judges’ Bill 
yielded similar results.  Representative Joseph Walsh of Massachusetts asked the only relevant 
question to Taft, wondering if “unless some relief is given in connection with this obligatory 
jurisdiction, that at the rate at which the court’s business is increasing it will be but a short time 
before the docket will be very badly congested and you will be very behind with your work.”247  
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Taft responded with a firm “yes,” explaining that the Court would take “18 months to two years 
to reach a case on the docket.”248  All of the other questions posed by the House drifted away 
from the heart of the bill, and regarded the Philippines and other territories of the United States, 
the federal circuit courts, and the Supreme Court reporter.   
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a second hearing on the Judges’ Bill about two 
years after the first on February 2, 1924.  Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland 
appeared before the committee to advocate for the bill and again address misconceptions and 
resistance to the bill.  Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana brought the most criticism in and out 
of the hearing, complaining that the Judges’ Bill gave the Justices unlimited discretion.249 
However, it was not one of the justices who handled Walsh’s criticism in the hearing.  
Once again, Taft’s connections proved fruitful as Chairman of the Committee on Uniformity of 
Judicial Procedure of the American Bar Association, Thomas W. Shelton, combatted much of the 
criticism in this hearing.  Shelton addressed Walsh, clarifying that “Now I want at this juncture 
to say just a few words with reference made to the bill by Senator Walsh . . . I want to say to you 
that when you read this that you read not what was presented to a big body of lawyers and only 
routine attention given to it,” but a bill that has been distributed to every lawyer, published in the 
ABA Journal, and the press.250  Shelton wanted to be clear in the fact that the bill had been 
meticulously planned with various groups, members of the legal community, and politicians 
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involved in the process.  Shelton further justified the involvement of judges and justices in the 
matter, illustrating that there are “few functions more highly technical than judicial procedure 
and which, when improperly applied, can become more wicked in results.”251  Shelton’s remarks 
proved effective and after two antagonizing years for Taft, the Senate passed the bill by a 
lopsided margin of seventy-six to one.252 
In the second House Hearing on the Judges’ Bill in 1924, Van Devanter deflected much 
of the criticism regarding how the Court comes to a decision on whether or not to grant cert to a 
particular case.  Van Devanter addressed this criticism outwardly, explaining:  
In conference these cases are called, each in its turn, and each judge states his views in 
extenso or briefly as he thinks proper; and when all have spoken any difference in 
opinion is discussed and then a vote is taken.  I explain this at some length because it 
seems to be thought outside that the cases are referred to particular judges, as, for 
instance, those coming from a particular circuit are referred to the justice assigned to that 
circuit, and that he reports on them, and the others accept his report.  That impression is 
wholly at variance with what actually occurs.253 
  
 Additionally, Van Devanter received questions from the Representatives, one being of 
particular importance.  Representative Andrew J. Montague of Virginia lead Van Devanter in 
question, proposing “Although you ask for discretionary power, you propose to exercise it in the 
method you have heretofore exercised it,” in which Van Devanter replied, “Certainly.  Of course, 
we could not maintain the institution and make it accomplish its purpose unless we did, and there 
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is no purpose to do anything else.”254  Van Devanter, in full transparency, again reassured the 
committee that this bill was not intended to provide the Court with powers that would alter the 
function, power, and purpose of the Court.  Taft and his Court wanted to assure that justice be 
served, and both bills presented to Congress facilitated the delivery of justice, and nothing more.  
 The Chief Justice made closing remarks, addressing the common misconception that the 
Judges’ Bill would deter justices from allotting the necessary time and care to a particular case 
on the docket.  Taft made clear that the purpose of certiorari is the contrary; “the proposition is 
that if we are given greater scope in this regard we may be able to give [each case] more time . . . 
I don’t think that anyone who has sat in the court as long as I have can be in the slightest degree 
influenced to the view that we do not give all the time necessary to these questions.”255 
 The Judges’ Bill in particular did not draw unusual attention.  In fact, lawmakers did not 
fully recognize its importance and impact.  Lurie called this fact to attention: “Considering the 
Judges’ Bill proposed the most far-ranging changes in Supreme Court jurisdiction in more than 
thirty years, the lack of interest by the House is striking,” especially considering “Only five 
congressmen spoke” at the second House Committee hearing.256  Despite the ordinarily 
gridlocked Congress, Taft experienced an unanticipated lobbying and passage process.   
The Unusual Origins of Taft’s Reforms and his Relationship with Federal Power 
Considering the historical context and political norms of the time, Taft’s reforms lay far 
outside of the traditional role of the chief justice.  However, “At every stage and in every major 
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development in our history the Court has been at ‘the storm center.’”257  Taft understood this 
trend, and in order to keep the Court in its proper place in history and to boost its power and 
prestige relative to that of the other two branches of government, Taft viewed reform as overdue 
and necessary.  Whether the Court continued to be at the storm center of major historical turns in 
the United States was a cause or effect of Taft’s reforms, this idea only further justifies the fact 
that Taft stepped outside of the traditional role of chief justice.  The reforms implemented by 
Taft proved essential to the continued functioning of the federal courts, which, in turn, further 
solidified the Supreme Court’s place in United States history and in all current events.   
The origins of Taft’s reform proved so unusual that it falls outside of two judicial reform 
theories: Congress-centered and Court-centered.  To elaborate, “under ‘Congress-centered’ 
explanations, we should expect substantial and independent congressional interest in judicial 
reform,” and under “‘Court-centered’ explanations, we should expect a landmark judicial 
decision embodying or announcing significant change,” as the traditional stages of judicial 
federalism reflect.  In Taft’s reforms, however, neither theory applied.258  Congress did not 
pursue such reform on its own; the federal court reforms passed by Congress during Taft’s tenure 
were consequences of Taft’s efforts.  In addition, although the Taft Court produced notable cases 
and opinions that merit discussion, no single landmark case stands out and defines his judicial 
reform.  Taft and his Court did not engage in judicial activism in this respect and did not 
manipulate cases brought to them in order to achieve reform; they used the government resources 
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provided to them under the United States Constitution to implement needed structural and 
doctrinal reform.  Overall, “In matters of federalism the record of the Taft period is mixed,” 
revealing no substantive trends on matters of expansion of federal power.259  Taft’s reforms were 
unprecedented, which further begs the question whether these reforms were within his power.  
Taft’s opinion on the expansion of federal power, specifically of power granted to the 
president, is reflected in Myers v. United States (1926).  Myers served as one of the few cases 
that provides insight regarding Taft’s attitude toward federal power, which can be further applied 
to his willingness to push the traditional boundaries of the chief justiceship.  This case proved 
unique in that the chief justice presiding over the Court examining the argument was a former 
president, giving Taft an unprecedented frame of reference.  Without question, “Taft did not 
approach the Myers case as a blank slate.  He held definite and strong preconceptions about 
presidential removal power, which he viewed through ‘executive colored glasses.’  He would 
bring to Myers the entire weight of his considerable presidential experience.”260  Indeed, Taft 
admitted that his opinion on this case was “one of the most important opinions I have ever 
written.”261   
 
259 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986, 
134.   
260 Robert Post.  “Tension in the Unitary Executive: How Taft Constructed the Epochal Opinion 
of Myers v. United States,” Journal of Supreme Court History 45 (2020): 172.   
261 Letter from William Howard Taft to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning, October 24, 1926.  Letter, 
William H. Taft Papers, as cited in Robert Post, “Tension in the Unitary Executive: How Taft 
Constructed the Epochal Opinion of Myers v. United States,” 167.   
Michalak  79 
In Myers, the Court examined an 1876 statute that outlined the appointment and removal 
of postmasters of various classes by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.  The 
question presented before the Court was whether the act unconstitutionally restricted the power 
of the president.  Delivering the opinion of the Court, Taft explained that in this instance the 
Constitution grants the president the power to act alone.  Taft concluded: “The fact that the 
executive power is given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis is 
appropriate, and limited by direct expressions where limitation is needed, and that no express 
limit is placed on the power of removal by the executive, is a convincing indication that none 
was intended.”262  Taft also drew argued that “on the merits, we find our conclusion strongly 
favoring the view which prevailed in the First Congress,” therefore allowing Taft to strike down 
the 1876 Act.263   
Overall, one of the most significant takeaways from Myers is that Taft’s opinion and 
reasoning provided insight on the degree to which he valued practicality.  Through his 
presidential experience, Taft gained appreciation of “the administrative needs of a nationally 
elected president for control, coherence, and efficiency.  Taft regarded these virtues as 
paramount when threatened by the bickering, petty, local, and merely political concerns of 
Congress.”264  Through this perspective, Taft was again appealing to typical progressive 
conservative thought.  Above all else, the practical effects of the reform were top priority.  Even 
 
262 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
263 Ibid. 
264 Robert Post.  “Tension in the Unitary Executive: How Taft Constructed the Epochal Opinion 
of Myers v. United States,” 187.   
Michalak  80 
as president, “strikingly, Taft had also urged Congress to put all postmasters, including first-class 
postmasters like Myers, ‘into the classified service’ and thus remove ‘the necessity for 
confirmation by the Senate,’” streamlining the entire process.265  Perhaps out of the personal 
desire to avoid the lengthy process of Senate confirmation, to improve the circumstances of the 
presidency, or both, Taft searched for areas of improvement in other roles besides his chief 
justiceship.     
In addition, Taft’s opinion also revealed his preference for the executive branch over the 
legislative, heavily relying on the express duties of the president outlined by the Constitution.  
Taft felt that as the statute stood, the president was unable to “discharge his own constitutional 
duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.”266  Taft recognized that the act’s original 
purpose was to “prevent a president from substituting his judgement for that of an appointed 
subordinate.”267  However, Taft believed that the idea that the president was meant to serve as 
the “general manager of the administration” better aligned with the powers granted in the 
Constitution, therefore prompting him to declare the act as unconstitutional.268   
On the surface it is easy to attribute Taft’s opinion to his personal bias and previous 
experience.  Of course, his prior role influenced his decision, but not in a way that compromised 
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Taft’s integrity as a jurist.  Evidenced in his actions as president, it is true that he had sought to 
remove at least 175 postmasters, but “he had always scrupulously adhered to the statute, even 
when the Senate refused to consent to requested removals.  He never once questions the 
constitutionality of the statue.”269  Considering Taft’s judicial tendencies as president, Taft was 
not motivated to arbitrarily override Congress to remove several individuals from office, nor was 
he motivated to allow further presidents to do so; in fact, he respected the statute while in office.   
In fact, “although Taft deeply believed in a ‘law-governed presidency,’ he was 
nevertheless clear that the president was ‘no figurehead.’”  For Taft, the Constitution equipped 
the president with the robust authority to carry out the duties accorded to him or her.270  Taft 
believed in a strong executive, one who carried out his or her duties to the fullest extent of his or 
her granted powers.  Most significant, Taft believed in an executive who acted within his or her 
proper sphere.  By striking down this act, Taft was interpreting the Constitution using his own 
methodology within the powers of a Supreme Court Justice.  The power to remove individuals 
from office no longer served the direct interests of an aging Taft; sitting on the Supreme Court 
was his final position.   
Conclusion: Were These Reforms Outside of Taft’s Powers as Chief Justice? 
Although it has been well established that Taft elected reform out of a personal desire to 
better the federal courts, a desire to better a particular branch of government is not analogous to a 
desire to alter that branch for personal benefit.  In fact, Taft’s goal of reform “was not just more 
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judges or a lighter workload empowered judiciary; his focus was not on gaining power in the 
short-term but on consolidating it for the long term.”271  Taft undoubtedly understood his 
personal passion and appreciation for the federal judiciary in these changes.  However, this 
dedication to maintaining and improving the federal courts reveals that his work proved to be 
tireless, selfless, and genuine.  It is clear that Congress enacted Taft’s reforms to improve the 
federal courts in the long run, not only to benefit his own Court, but more important, to shape the 
federal courts for decades to come.   
Overall, Taft accomplished his own goals in reforming the federal courts by unifying the 
third branch of government and clearing up much of the federal docket, especially the Supreme 
Court’s.  His reforms resulted in various consequences, both unintended and ironic.  The 
introduction of the writ of certiorari enhanced the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting powers, 
allowing the Courts to hand pick which compelling legal questions they would prefer to hear.  As 
a result, the number of cases actually heard by the Court has declined significantly, revealing the 
reaching effect of the Judges’ Bill.  Ironically, although Taft’s reforms united the federal courts 
in terms of communication and branch cohesion and vested more power in the Supreme Court, 
the Supreme Court’s ability to grant cert on only a narrow set of cases has allowed the federal 
circuit courts to become the de facto court of last resort for most disputes.  Thus, this 
decentralized the federal courts to a degree.  Taft’s reforms are not the sole reason for this trend 
in litigation; the explosion of litigation in the latter half of the twentieth century along with a 
multitude of social and political factors have contributed to the evolving nature of the modern 
 
271 Justin Crowe, “The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the 
Reforms of William Howard Taft,” 80.   
Michalak  83 
federal courts.  These consequences should not take away from the importance of Taft’s reforms 
and Taft’s judicial legacy.   
The fact that Taft’s unprecedented reform measures carried some unintended 
consequences does not serve as evidence that they were outside of his powers granted to him 
under the Constitution.  Indeed, “it is certainly true that he was more powerful—as a politician, 
as an administrator, and certainly as a policymaker—than most of his predecessors had been.”272  
Evidence that Taft wielded more administrative power over his own Court simply reveals the 
strength of his judicial management skills on the Court compared to his predecessors and 
successors.  The power Taft possessed, however, was not prohibited by the Constitution, and in 
reality, should be applauded and admired. 
Considering all aspects of Taft’s reforms, Taft’s judicial leadership strategies and 
methods were not self-centered power grabs.  Procedurally, Taft used the powers granted to him 
to their fullest extent.  Nevertheless, he did not usurp or overextend the powers given to the chief 
justice and the federal judiciary.  Article III of the Constitution provides little guidance on the 
exact structure of the federal judiciary, and the structure of the judiciary has been consistently 
altered through acts of legislation over the course of United States history.  Taft followed the 
proper procedural steps to enact his reforms with extreme care, while Congress enacted each 
statute as delegated by Article I of the Constitution.  The manner in which Taft redefined the role 
of the chief justice was not out of Taft’s desire for more power.  The reformed role of the chief 
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justice symbolizes the unified third branch of government as well as Taft’s relentless work ethic 
and judicial administration skills.   
In addition to Chief Justice John Marshall, Chief Justice Taft completed the most 
significant structural change to the federal court system since the founding of the United States.  
To say that Taft’s reforms acted as a catalyst for the growth of the federal judiciary and 
contributed to the current state of the United States federal court system is an understatement.  
Indeed, the impact of Taft’s reforms can be felt across the United States almost one hundred 
years later.  Taft served as a true judicial reformer, one who felt deeply about his cause and who 
possessed a clear vision of an effective, unified federal court system with one goal in mind: the 
proper and timely delivery of justice.     
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